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11. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Introduction
This paper was written on the basis of my personal experience, first as a trainer and
then as chairperson of the Palestinian Model Parliament for Women and Legislation (MP)
in Gaza. The MP was established in 1997 with the aim of proposing Palestinian laws and
legislation based on equality and human rights.1 The specific objective of the Model Par-
liament’s campaign in Gaza was modification of the Family Law to correct its discrimina-
tory nature. The women participating in the project were frequently intimidated by the Is-
lamist parties, who labelled the women’s actions anti-Islamic. That experience, together
with my 20 years of political activity for the rights of Palestinians to their own homeland,
stimulated me to look more deeply into the reasons for the positions taken on women’s is-
sues by the dominant forces in Palestine. Therefore, this paper is an attempt to analyze the
nature of the reaction of the Islamists and nationalists to the movement to reform the Fam-
ily Law in Palestine, and the factors determining that reaction.
The overall picture that emerges is that women’s interests have been marginalized
because of the fluctuating force relations that are part of the struggle for power in the re-
gion as well as between the Palestinian Authority (PA) and the Islamist parties. All three
actors want to expand their boundaries. Women who want to change gender relations wish
to break out of the limitations set by society/tradition, by the Palestinian Authority/law,
and by the Islamists/social sanctions. To do this, they rely on international human rights
conventions and the Convention to Eliminate Discrimination Against Women. Because of
the relative powerlessness of the PA in international relations, the women’s campaign car-
ries the threat of negative international reaction if force is used to stop them from raising
their voices.
The Islamists want to extend their boundaries to strengthen their control of the
minds and bodies of Palestinians and thus undermine the hegemony of the PA, as well as
to break out of the political boundaries set by the PA. For this they rely on the hegemonic
power of religion, using interpretations of Quran that support their control.
                                                
1 The MP project was the culmination of four years of work by the Women’s Centre for Legal Aid and
Counselling (WCLAC), which reviewed gender-based discriminatory laws and proposed and lobbied for
amendments to them, in addition to raising the consciousness of women about their legal rights.
2In an extension of their role as ‘defenders of the faith’, the Islamists link any at-
tempt to improve the lives of Palestinian women with a perceived international (Western)
conspiracy against Islam.2 The ever-present Israeli threat acts to their benefit because they
are seen as the only force willing to stand up to the enemy. They use this in calling for the
maintenance of ‘Islamic traditions’ such as the veil. Thus, they turn women’s bodies into a
national treasure that needs to be protected by men, and over which women are allowed no
control.
For its part, the PA wants to go beyond the limited options available to it as the
guarantor of Israel’s security under the Oslo agreement. (This agreement is discussed fur-
ther in section 1.3.). Therefore, its internal policies are decided by the space it can negoti-
ate with the Islamists without alienating Israel, and it is in this negotiation that women’s
interests suffer, as will be explained later in this study. It uses the relevant UN resolutions
and conventions to make its case internationally for a speedy Israeli withdrawal from the
occupied territories so that a Palestinian homeland can become a reality. Internally, in ad-
dition to obtaining a certain degree of consent in various ways, it also uses coercion and
force to maintain its power.
This study consists of five chapters. Chapter 1 introduces the research topic against
the historical and political background of Palestine. It mainly elaborates on the history of
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and its relevance to the internal political power relations.
The emphasis will be on the link between the geopolitical situation and control over
women’s sexuality. The chapter also outlines the research problem and objectives, lists the
main research questions and presents the conceptual framework, methodology, scope and
limitations of the study and the sources of data.
Chapter 2 presents the main concepts and theories on which the research is based.
The concepts will be defined and linked with the thesis topic and research problem. Chap-
ter 3 examines the Model Parliament experience with a view to using it as a basis for later
analysis of the counter-campaign in response to it. The chapter also contains an analysis of
the discriminatory nature of the Family Law in Palestine.
                                                
2 The study will show later that this is similar to the discourse of Islamists in Egypt, but will not analyze that
similarity because of time and space limitations.
3Chapter 4 presents the counter-campaign launched against the Model Parliament,
using the concepts chosen in Chapter 2. It also analyzes the discourse of the Palestinian
Authority (PA) and the Islamists in terms of their policies and practices. This analysis en-
ables us to uncover the relation between, on the one hand, the PA’s political weakness in
the Middle East, and on the other, its policies towards the Islamists and its attitude towards
the women’s movement.3 It helps to analyze the gendered policies and practices of the PA
and the Islamists. Finally, Chapter 5 concludes the findings and outlines strategies that can
be used by the women’s movement in Palestine for greater effectiveness towards achieving
a society built on democracy and equality.
This analysis is positioned in four contexts: international, because the lives of all
the people in the Middle East are affected by what happens at that level; political, because
Palestinians as a whole are affected by the political manoeuvring of regional and local ac-
tors; social, because in Palestine women’s subordination is based on socially constructed
identity; and legal, because this study uses the Family Law reform proposed by the Model
Parliament for Women and Legislation to analyze the PA’s and the Islamists’ discourses.
1.2 The international context
The Middle East is of high strategic value to major economic powers because of its
vast reserves of cheap energy. This has been an important reason for international support
to Israel, which, in turn, has affected all the countries in the region. The main international
player in the region following the break-up of the Soviet Union has been the United States
of  America. U.S.  support  to  Israel  is derived from its  role as  a proxy  to carry  out U.S.
                                                
3 As will be explained in section 4.2, the Palestinian women’s movement covers a wide political spectrum,
from the extreme Left to the Islamist women’s organizations. In this study, the term is used to denote sup-
porters of action to achieve gender equality. Thus, Islamist women’s organizations are excluded.
4policies in the region despite Israeli violations of international law and human rights.4
Israel is not an ordinary state, it was artificially created in 1948 and is externally
sustained – to the tune of some $ 4 bn. annually – by the U.S. (Herman, 1994). It is a rac-
ist,5 colonial settler state6 founded by Britain and supported by the U.S. to safeguard and
control oil and other economic and military interests in the region. Israel plays its reaction-
ary role beyond the boundaries of the Middle East. Chomsky (1989) notes that whenever
the U.S. has political difficulties supplying anti-democratic or fascist regimes with guns,
bombs and torture equipment, Israel, with U.S. financial support, fills the breach. It also
acts as an export promoter by stimulating huge arms sales to the Arab states, thus helping
to recycle petrodollars to U.S. industry. In addition, Israel has close links with U.S. intelli-
gence and the Pentagon, both in military production as well in testing of advanced weap-
ons against defenceless targets. As one Israeli satirist phrased the relationship, “My master
gives me food to eat and I bite those he tells me to bite.” An Israeli analyst commented,
“It’s like Israel has become just another federal agency, one that’s convenient to use when
you want something done quietly” (both quoted in Chomsky, 1994:206).
The U.S. has shown in practice that the type of political system dominating in the
Middle East is unimportant as long as  its  interests  are  safeguarded. If  anything, the U.S.
                                                
4 The reason for Western support is frequently said to be guilt over the Holocaust. However, the West is also
influenced by the electoral and financial strength of the Jewish community in various countries. Edward
Herman (1994) believes that Israel is supported by dominant circles in the U.S. because of its surrogate role
in the Middle East as well as its support for aggressive strategies and the arms race. He debunks ‘Western
guilt’ over the Holocaust as an important factor. Observing that guilt rarely, if ever, affects national policy,
he asks why such guilt is not aroused by the history of black slavery and subsequent discrimination against
blacks, or the destruction of the indigenous ‘Indians’. Similarly, why is there no guilt over Western conniv-
ance in the expulsion of Palestinians from their homeland and their victimization during 30 years of occupa-
tion? Herman says anti-Arab racism, if it exists, cannot be a causal factor since it is mainly an effect and re-
flection of interest and policy. Susan Madeiros (1998) gives other reasons for the U.S. policy: the power of
the pro-Israel lobby and the refusal of the mainstream media to analyze or criticize Washington’s uncondi-
tional support for Israel. She observes that half the annual U.S. foreign aid goes to Israel, and that it is not
reduced despite official hand wringing about the need for budget cuts.
5 Herman (1994) mentions that scapegoating is a function of power and interest. The Palestinians and many
other Arabs have little economic or military muscle and stand in the way of powerful interests. It is ironic
that by leading the racist derogation and dehumanization of Arabs, the Jewish establishment are doing to
others what was done, with such terrible consequences, to their own in-group.
6 The Israeli policy towards Palestinian land was well expressed by Joseph Weitz: “The question of the land
of Israel and the question of the Jews would be raised beyond the framework of “development”; amongst
ourselves. It must be clear that there is no room for both peoples {Arabs and Jews] in this country… if the
Arabs leave the country, it will be broad and wide-open for us. And if the Arabs stay, the country will remain
narrow and miserable” (quoted in Said, 1980: 99).
5opposes democracy in the region because “it is much simpler to manipulate a few ruling
families – to secure fat orders for arms and insure that oil price remains low – than a wide
variety of personalities and policies bound to be thrown up by a democratic system” (Hiro,
cited in Chomsky 1994:198). For example, the Arab country with which the U.S. has the
strongest ties is Saudi Arabia, which does not qualify as a democracy in any sense at all:
power is monopolized by one family, the rights of citizens are limited, women are treated
as chattel, and human rights are non-existent.7
Chomsky (1994) argues that the U.S. has always been against democracy in the
Arab world (though a formal electoral façade is acceptable as long as it conforms to the
required top-down forms of democratic change that leave U.S. clients in power. Expressing
the same view, Said (1980:198) points out that “the U.S. position could not have meant
any less than a wholehearted unwillingness to encourage those Middle Eastern processes
of history to which, in its own history, the U.S. paid homage: the struggle for independ-
ence, human rights, freedom from tyranny”.
While the iron fist (Chomsky, 1994) has often been preferred by US administra-
tions, Washington sometimes waves the human rights banner when its interests require it.
For example, Saddam Hussein as Chomsky argues was one of Washington’s best clients
for a long time, but when he became a threat to American interests, he was transformed
into a megalomaniac needing to be punished. Such punishment also had the advantage of
being a warning to others who might be tempted to act against U.S. interests. The power
politics of the U.S. and Israel to insure their interests in the region has put the Middle East
under “forms of imperial control that are similar to those [policies] used by British forces
in India, the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe, Nazi Germany in occupied France, the US in
Latin America, and so on” (Chomsky, 1994:250).
In this scenario, Palestinians and others who have little to contribute to the basic
power structure in the region have no rights. Chomsky (1994:271) argues that the basic
rules of world order remain as they  have  always  been: “the rule of law for the weak [and]
                                                
7 For more details, see: U.S Department of State Human Rights Report on Saudi Arabia 1996, released by
Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor on 30 January 1997 (http://www.state.gov/www/global/
hu…ghts/1996_hrp_report/saudiara.html); Amnesty International annual report 1999 on Saudi Arabia
(http://www. Amnesty.org/ailib/aireport/ar99/mde23.htm).
6the rule of force for the strong”. The Palestinians only role, Chomsky adds, is as pawns in
various struggles for power. However, this study does not fully agree with him. Through a
combination of resistance and negotiation, Palestinians have up to a certain extent suc-
ceeded in convincing the international community that they are victims of Israeli aggres-
sion. Thus, they do have some power.
1.3 The political context
The 1993 Oslo agreement between the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO)
and Israel was a landmark in the struggle of the Palestinian people for self-determination
and statehood. The agreement was mediated on the basis of a severe imbalance of power
between Israel and the PLO, where Israel always had the upper hand. The Oslo agreement
“does not talk about the Palestinians as a nation, [or] as a people, … does not recognize the
existence of the refugees,  … does not deal with territory, with the land; [and] the land is
separated from the people” (Jadallah, cited in Parker, 1999:69). (Italics added.) For most
Palestinians, Bishara argues, the Oslo agreement is wholly an Israeli formula (Usher,
1995a), for by its terms the PLO became the guardian of Israeli security rather than the se-
curity of Palestinians. On the other hand, the agreement enables the PA to “control the
population without reference to sovereignty – specifically those rights over land, resources,
and external relations, … it allows an élite to assert a claim to political leadership without
the need to legitimate itself through the articulation of a social agenda” (Parker, 1999:xii).
The Israeli occupation had a great impact on the Palestinian social structure in gen-
eral, and it affected – and continues to affect – Palestinian internal politics in terms of alli-
ance building and mediation of conflicts between the different political groups and institu-
tions. This reality had a direct impact on the women’s agenda in the occupied territories.
Women played an active role in the national struggle against the occupier and they were
the immediate victims of Israeli policies such as expropriation of land, demolition of
houses, and imprisonment of political activists. Their social position would, therefore, have
been expected to improve with the establishment of a geographical and political Palestinian
entity. However, that has not happened, for reasons that include the structural patriarchal
7relations within Palestinian society, the powerlessness of the ‘leftist parties’, the weakness
of the Palestinian Authority,8 and the strong popularity of the Islamist parties.
Bishara observes that since 1971, the PLO’s nationalism has been in transition from
a policy of liberation to one of statehood (Usher, 1995a). Several significant events/factors
can be identified in the PLO’s quest for statehood: the PLO’s military defeat in Lebanon;
the rise of the national movement, especially the Intifada,9 in the occupied territories; and
the collapse of the Soviet Union. The Gulf war was another watershed because it changed
the international and regional balance of power, putting the PLO in danger of being re-
duced to nothing more than a disintegrating bureaucracy located in Tunis, without funds.
Its only aim was survival and its only claim to legitimacy was that it represented Palestini-
ans. However, its support among Palestinians was declining as the Intifada gained mo-
mentum. All these factors made it possible for the Israelis to recognize the PLO and led to
the signing of the Oslo agreement on 13 September 1993. For Bishara, the agreement
originated a process which sustained Israel’s historical position of neither full withdrawal
from, nor annexation of, all the occupied territories, but it addressed the problem of no
status quo ante (Usher, 1995a) by making the PLO responsible for Israel’s security from
Palestinian attacks without allowing Palestinians the right to self-determination.10
The PA’s poor performance opens the door to further criticism from all sectors of
the political spectrum (Hilal, 1995), particularly with regard to the autocratic and authori-
tarian style of its head. The rising popularity of the Islamists is  one expression  of this criti
                                                
8 The Palestinian Authority was established by the PLO to govern the areas from which Israel withdrew after
the Oslo agreement in 1993. The PLO continues to exist as an organization representing Palestinians as a
whole.
9 Intifada (meaning “uprising”) was a mass protest over the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza. It
started in December 1987 and continued until the beginning of the so-called ‘peace process’ initiated by the
U.S. after the Iraqi defeat in the second Gulf war of 1991. Its main activities changed from mass-based ac-
tions to prolonged and institutionalized actions. The main objective of the uprising was to exhaust the occu-
pying power rather than to evict it through a combination of local and international pressure. The most re-
markable features of the Intifada were not only the participation of Palestinians from all sectors and classes,
but also the ease with which mobilization was carried out and the support structure built within few months
after its eruption (Hiltermann, 1991).
10 For more details about the Oslo agreement shortcomings,  see (Chomsky, 1991; 1993); (Rabbani, 1996);
(Usher, 1999)
8cism. Hamas, the largest Islamist party, is primarily a creation of the Israeli occupation.11
Hasan (1993) contends that Israel nurtured and allowed Hamas to act without interference
for a long time. One indication of this was that until the killings inside Israel increased, the
number of Hamas prisoners in relation to the size of the organization was lower than that
of prisoners from other organizations. Usher (1995b:67) makes a similar observation, that
despite its propaganda against Jews, “Hamas’ relation with the occupation authorities re-
mained essentially quietest, with the [Israeli] army never interfering with Hamas strike
days”. Hamas is financed by Saudi Arabia, the most conservative country in the Arab
world. Usher (1995b:66) notes that, “Lubricated by Saudi money, in Gaza especially
[Hamas] built an impressive social infrastructure, by 1986 controlling 40% of Gaza’s
mosques and its single Islamic university, which with 7,000 students, was the largest in the
territories.”
As Hilal (1995:17) observes, “the polarization of political forces between the ‘na-
tionalist secular Right’ (represented by the biggest movement in the PLO, Fatah, allied to a
locally based bourgeoisie) and the Islamists … has tended to marginalize the Palestinian
Left. Thus, a sizeable sector of Palestinian society (committed to democracy, political,
cultural and religious pluralism, equality and social justice) remains without a platform and
a unifying organizational framework”.12 The political vacuum in Palestinian politics due to
the weakness of the Left has been filled by two alternatives. One is the revival of the tradi-
tional social structures encouraged by the PA, and the second is the increased popularity of
the Islamic parties. In both cases, the big losers are Palestinian society, particularly Pales-
tinian women. The reform and renewal of national institutions and the democratization of
the political and social process remain the most urgent problems facing Palestinians. It is
necessary to articulate a clear conception of a democratic Palestinian state and the rights
                                                
11 Hamas (the Islamic resistance movement) was founded in February 1988, two months after the eruption of
the Intifada, by activists of the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood (a pan-Islamic political move-
ment founded in Egypt in 1937) (Jad, 1995; Hiltermann, 1991; Hammami, 1990). The Palestinian branch of
the Muslim Brotherhood had emerged in the occupied territories in the 1970s as a “culturalist and social
movement whose primary aim was the founding of the Islamic personality … this entails an abstention from
all forms of anti-occupation activity, prioritizing instead a cultural struggle against the PLO’s atheist com-
mitment to secular nationalism” (Usher, 1995b:66).
12 The dilemma that shared by all the Palestinian political parties after the signing of  Oslo  agreement, is
well analyzed by Klein (1997)
9and duties of its citizens, as well as the State’s responsibilities to the citizens, in a frame-
work encompassing all Palestinians, men and women.
1.4 The social context
Part of the land on which the state of Israel was established in 1948 was Palestin-
ian. Thus, the creation of Israel transformed the Palestinian people into a refugee nation,
affecting the social and physical life of a people of essentially peasant origin. The social
fabric of the refugee Palestinians continued to be based on patriarchal relations. Mayer
(1997) sees this as evidence of the sense of security and solidarity that such relations pro-
vided to the refugee groups. In 1967, Israeli military forces occupied the remnants of Pal-
estinian land. The occupation and its brutal treatment of the people gave rise to local self-
help organizations forged as forms of resistance. A national liberation movement with a
developed infrastructure of institutions – student groups, labour unions, women’s commit-
tees, agricultural and medical relief associations, and other voluntary works organizations
(Hiltermann, 1991; Taraki, 1997) – took away power from traditional landowners and be-
gan building popular institutions which had a great influence in the political arena and
which Israel found impossible to eliminate.
Yet, despite the substantial political development of Palestinian society, gender re-
lations, social stratification and ‘traditions’ were not transformed much. Palestinian politi-
cal organizations developed within an environment that endorsed tensions between two
opposing discourses: on the one hand, the social relations of patronage (Brynen, 1995a,
1995b) and personal power and authority;13 and on the other, the discourse of national
struggle, liberation, national rights, citizens’ responsibility, and political values (Taraki,
1997). The confrontation between the two continued until1993, when political changes
culminated with the signing of the Oslo agreement. As a result of these opposing dis-
courses, when we investigate the legacy of the Palestinian national movement, we find
several layers.
                                                
13 In this context, Sharabi (1988) is an important source for analysis of the distortions in Arab “neo-patriarchal
society”. Referring to the patronage system in the Arab world, which could equally easily be applied to Palestinian
society and Palestinian politics, Sharabi notes that “society actually is only subject to the will of the rich and pow-
erful, a will delimited only by material capacity and institutionalized ethical injunction” (1988:47). In sum, all so-
cial arrangements in neo-patriarchal society are based on this powerful-powerless relation.
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At the political level, PLO institutions succeeded in shaping the parameters of po-
litical institutions and grassroots organizations in the occupied territories. To confront the
occupiers’ power, the PLO developed a strategy consisting of three elements: assailing the
occupiers’ power and its institution; outadministrating the enemy by setting up parallel hi-
erarchies; and creating a new hegemony of resistance (Hiltermann, 1991). This strategy
contributed successfully to mobilizing broad sectors of society into mainstream politics,
even those that had traditionally been kept out of formal politics. Thus, a promising local
leadership emerged in the1970s and a new generation of activists became involved in mass
organization (Taraki, 1997; Jad, 1995). The Israeli occupation, which affects every aspect
of the people’s lives and the discourse of resistance applied by the PLO and its constituting
organizations, began the process through which politics became a part of everyday life in
Palestine. Therefore, it is not surprising that the world of politics has been separated from
its narrow-elite base practice (Taraki, 1997).
Palestinian women were part of this process, forming women’s mass-based com-
mittees (Hammami, 1995; Mayer, 1998; Hiltermann, 1991; Jad, 1995)14 in an effort to re-
spond to the needs and aspirations of Palestinian women under occupation.15 These com-
mittees were organized in villages, refugee camps and towns. The political participation of
Palestinian women within the PLO organizations did not imply a feminist consciousness or
the promotion of a feminist agenda, since every activity had to be under the political ban-
ner of the PLO organizations. Thus, the public has perceived the women’s movement as an
extension of the political parties rather than as a ‘feminist movement’. Several researchers
have observed that the women’s movement, while not differing in philosophy from faction
to faction, lacked coherent goals and strategies, and was unable to speak with one voice
(Mayer, 1997). Joseph (1986) says that women’s movement within the national struggle
                                                
14 According to Jad (1995), the first women’s committee was formed on International Women’s Day in 1978.
Its purpose was to reach the majority of Palestinian women living in villages and in the refugee camps of the
West Bank and Gaza. The activists in the committee “were also seeking an alternative to the charitable so-
cieties, whose leaders excluded them in order to preserve their own position and power” (Jad, 1995:232).
(Italics added.)
15 Women’s status in Palestinian society is marked by contradictory features. On the one hand, women par-
ticipate actively in political life and their educational level has improved considerably; but on the other, they
are still constrained from equality and participation in the public arena. Such constraints are evident in the
high fertility rate, relatively low participation in the labour market (10-16%) and legal discrimination against
women, especially in the Family Law (UNDP, 1998; Said, 1998).
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has carefully avoided challenging patriarchal structures, thus deflecting the emergence of
feminist consciousness.
The discourse of resistance attracted every Palestinian to participate and shape the
future of Palestine, regardless of his region (village or refugee camp), gender or age.
Mayer (1997) refers to the paradoxes created by the occupation in the lives of Palestinians:
for instance, children were actively encouraged to confront, and rewarded for confronting,
the occupation forces with what might be termed undisciplined behaviour; however, at the
same time fathers expected those same children to obey their authority unquestioningly.
Hiltermann (1991:193) refers to the fact that women’s participation in the Intifada was a
clear manifestation of “casting off the yoke of gender oppression”.16
Developing in such an environment, the Palestinian political and organizational
structure has remained conventional on the social level. It has found expression in a na-
tionalist discourse which gives significance to an idealization of the past and ‘tradition’ in
a way that is similar to that of other nationalist movements. The repression of occupation
had a significant impact on Palestinian life that makes traditional practices a meaningful
way of expressing identity (Mayer, 1997).
Moreover, the family is the basic and most important unit of Arab society. The ex-
tended family is still important despite the fact that Palestinian society has moved towards
a nuclear family structure over the last 30 years. Marriage, as an institution, is of un-
matched importance for obtaining recognition in the adult community, especially among
the poor and refugees.17 Marriage is often not simply a bonding between individuals, but
also a bond between families (Mayer, 1997). Therefore, it strengthens and consolidates
patriarchal relations based on clans and tribes and has contributed to the maintenance of
traditional practices.
Sharabi convincingly argues that “the dominance of the father (patriarch), the cen-
tre around which the nation as well as  the ‘family’  are  organized”, is  as  much a  psycho
                                                
16 By their active participation in the Intifada, Palestinian women broke the red line of the public/private di-
chotomy. The striking images (Hiltermann, 1991) of women marching in the streets, throwing stones at Is-
raeli soldiers, carrying baskets of stones to supply younger demonstrators, arguing and tussling with soldiers
to win the release of an arrested demonstrator, originated the idea that the Intifada was not only about “
‘shaking off’ of military rule, but … a social revolution in its own right” (Hiltermann, 1991:193).
17 For a broader analysis of attitudes towards marriage in Palestinian society, see Hammami (1993).
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logical feature of Palestinian society as it is of Arab society. “Thus, between the ruler and
the ruled, the father and child, there exist only vertical relations: in both settings the pater-
nal will is the absolute will, mediated by a forced consensus based on ritual and coercion”
(Sharabi, 1988:7).
In the nationalist discourse, women are the symbolic ‘container’ of Palestinian
identity. The glorification of women’s fertility, the recognition of their bodies as the most
important part of national resources, and the encouragement to bear more children as part
of the national struggle against the Israelis was an explicit expression in the Palestinian
national discourse. Al-Bizri (1995:172) quotes PLO leader Yasser Arafat as saying, “The
wombs of Palestinian women are bombs in the confrontation with the Israelis.” Therefore,
“in the context of Intifada … Palestinian men are interested in increasing the Palestinian
population, and the Israeli occupiers are interested in limiting it, women’s bodies [are] the
site of the battle with little control left to them over their own bodies” (Ashrawi, cited in
Mass, 1995:470).
1.5 The legal context
In the twentieth century, Palestinian women and men have been subject to a suc-
cession of overlapping legal systems of non-Palestinian origin. For example, the frame-
work delineating the formal legal status of Palestinian women in terms of their personal
rights was shaped during the Ottoman period (before the First World War). Later, during
British colonial rule over Palestine, in spite of critical questions raised by women con-
cerning their social and legal status, they were excluded from decision-making, power, and
governance. The marginalization of Palestinian women continued during the national
struggle, when the national movement’s priority was liberation: social, economic and legal
issues facing the society were sidelined, in particular those deeply affecting the Palestinian
women who were also part of the national struggle. The elections for the first Palestinian
Council in 1996 presented new opportunities for Palestinian men and women to debate the
laws and policies that would direct their social affairs. The Palestinian Model Parliament
for Women and Legislation was launched in 1997 as part of a comprehensive effort to
highlight the discriminatory nature of the inherited legislation in general and the Family
Law in particular. The project initiated the study of women’s status under the current laws,
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specifically under the Family Law, and the best approach to improving their legal status
under this law.
1.6 Indication of the problem
The Model Parliament (MP) project conducted its advocacy campaign in 1997-98,
addressing modification of the Family Law as its main objective in Gaza Strip, while in the
West Bank its objective was to review all the current laws in Palestine. In Gaza, the project
was based on the recognition that the Family Law is a crucial determinant of women’s le-
gal, social, economic and political status. The campaign came at a crucial time in Pales-
tine’s political evolution towards statehood, and it tried to address a complex range of legal
issues in order to propose effective gender-sensitive laws and policies.
The MP’s campaign and activities were met by different responses from the gen-
dered male-dominated political institutions. This thesis will analyze the politics of these
institutions and the way in which they arrange and conduct their political alliances and
conflicts. It will discuss the policies and practices of the main actors, namely the Palestin-
ian Authority and the Islamist parties. It will examine how Palestinian women are concep-
tualized within the Family Law. As implemented in Palestine, this law has led to the rein-
forcement of male domination and female subordination, and it is reasonable to expect that
the nature/ conceptualization of this law will have a direct impact on the way Palestinian
women lead their lives in the future.
1.7 Description of the actors
Various actors played a role in the reaction to the MP: the Palestinian Authority,
the Islamists, formal religious institutions, the women’s movement, the leftist parties, hu-
man rights organizations, etc. However, the actors that were most influential were the PA
and the Islamists.
1.7.1 The Palestinian Authority
The Palestinian Authority (PA) represents a “state under formation”, which limits
its options with regard to external pressures. It has followed a strategy that compromises
women’s rights by paying lip-service to the gender question. This was demonstrated
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clearly when the conflict between the Islamist parties and the MP reached a critical point,
with the MP raising the issue of equal rights for women in the Family Law, and the PA
adopted a position closer to that of the Islamists.
To analyze the PA’s contradictory positions, we have to understand that the Oslo
agreement is essentially a security arrangement, which includes, among other things, a
commitment by the PA to safeguard the state of Israel from its Palestinian opponents. To
meet this obligation, the PA has engaged in various activities such as the initiation of re-
pressive practices, including imprisonment and regular torture of political opponents, un-
der the all-embracing justification of ‘national interest’. In this context, the PA’s pandering
to the Islamist parties on the issue of modifying the Family Law can be interpreted as a
tactic to keep the Islamists occupied in a confrontation with the MP, thus diverting some of
their attention from confrontation with Israel. This study will analyze this tactic in greater
detail, showing why and how social questions, including the women’s agenda, provide
space for political bargaining between the PA and the Islamist parties.
1.7.2 The Islamist parties
The Islamists constantly emphasize that Palestinian society is locked in daily strug-
gle with a neighbouring country that makes no secret of its enemity. Thus, they construct
Palestinian identity as one under threat. Because the household is perceived as the domain
of women, they are the preservers of this identity, which legitimizes control over their
bodies and voices. Any attempt to modify the Family Law is, by definition, a challenge
and threat to national and religious identity.
This study uses the term Islamists rather than fundamentalists because the latter
term is a value-laden concept which tends to be used in the context of political terrorism.
In this study, there is no intention to characterize the military strategies of any of the ac-
tors.
1.8 The research
1.8.1 Objectives
The overriding purpose of this study is to explore the factors that are hindering the
attempts of Palestinian women to improve their position in their society, in order to deter-
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mine ways of making their attempts more effective. In order to do this, the study’s objec-
tives are to:
• Analyze the gendered policies and practices of the PA and the Islamist parties;
• Unveil the relation between the PA’s internal politics, and more specifically its
control over women’s sexuality, and its relations with Israel;
• Build up the concepts that are relevant to the research.
1.8.2 Questions to be answered
This study will attempt to answer the following questions:
• Why and how, despite their ideological and political differences, do the Pales-
tinian Authority and the Islamist parties co-operate to sacrifice women’s inter-
ests and hinder them from putting their concerns on the public agenda?
• How can we conceptualize the political alliance between the PA and the Is-
lamist parties as two polarized political forces acting together to exclude
women’s interests from the public agenda?
• What are the underlying motives and interests behind the gendered policies of
the institutions under analysis?
1.8.3 Methodology
Discourse analysis is used in this study as a critical tool to understand and analyze
the function of the male-dominated institutions that control women’s sexuality in Palestine.
Discourse analysis (with specific reference to the Foucauldian perspective) “seeks to ex-
plain the relations and forces of power from the discursive evidence available. It is a ver-
sion centrally concerned with the social interests inherent in particular ways of governing
subjects and, as such, has important political implications for the present” (Weedon,
1989:115). It “expands the field of potential political activity … avoiding, as it does, the
reductionism of single-cause analyses” (Weedon, 1989:122). Discourses should be ana-
lyzed in terms of “what reciprocal effect of power and knowledge they ensure” and “what
conjunction and what force relationship make their utilization necessary” (Foucault,
1981:102, cited in Weedon, 1989:122). Documents/articles and literature will be cited to
support the analysis of the underlying agenda and motives of the institutions, as well as of
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the institutional structures, policies, practices and discussions relevant to the Model Par-
liament’s campaign.
1.8.4 Conceptual framework
The conceptual framework of this study is derived from the methodology. The fol-
lowing concepts are used: discourse, power, hegemony, power politics, nationalism and
patriarchy. These are employed as conceptual tools to conceive the discourses of the actors
under examination.
1.8.5 Sources of data
For information that can be used in the analysis, this study will rely heavily on the
available documents, articles, and policy papers produced/published by the institutions
being analyzed, and on media reports relating to them. The conceptual framework will be
based on existing literature in the ISS library and in corresponding libraries in The Neth-
erlands.
1.8.6 Scope and limitations of the study
This thesis does not claim to study the whole range of male-dominated institutions
in Palestine, nor all of their gendered policies and practices. Rather, the focus is only on
the institutional response to the Model Parliament campaign as being representative of the
attitude towards the position of women in Palestine.
Palestine was established as an entity only five years ago and is not yet a state.
During these five years, the Palestinian Authority’s public pronouncements have focused
on issues related to its role under the Oslo agreement as the guardian of Israel’s security.
Therefore, there is a lack of direct documentation about the PA’s attitude towards Pales-
tinian identity, culture and women’s place in society. This constitutes an important limita-
tion of this thesis. To overcome it, the PA’s attitude is gauged by its tolerance of the Is-
lamist attacks on the women’s movement. In this context, not having a response is in itself
a response. The thesis also reaches conclusions on the basis of the PA’s pronouncements
about the type of legal system that should govern Palestinian life and the similarities be-
tween the PA’s and the Islamists’ discourses concerning women.
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The thesis also does not identify and discuss the diverse trends within the Palestin-
ian women’s movement because, while they are important, space limitations place them
outside the scope of this study. They are presented as a component of further research sug-
gested at the end of the thesis.
The differences among Islamists in Palestine are also not explored. Chapter 3 men-
tions that some Islamists did participate in the Model Parliament and Chapter 4 provides
some evidence of differences among Islamist ideologues on the question of women’s rights
under Islam, but no attempt is made to delve into the issue. The fact is that in general the
attitude of Islamists towards the MP was negative and it would serve little purpose to go
into the details of secondary differences in a study of this scope. Similarly, the study does
not examine the differences within the PA institutions. The reason is lack of empirical
data, in combination with space and time limitations. Furthermore, the discourses in neigh-
bouring countries and detailed examination of Israeli policies fall outside the scope this
study.
2 THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
2.1 Introduction
This chapter defines the concepts that are used for the analysis in the rest of the the-
sis. As noted in section 1.8.4, the concepts were derived from the discourse analysis meth-
odology used in the study. They were chosen to analyze the Islamists’ and the PA’s dis-
courses as well as to determine why and how women are marginalized in Palestine.
The factor that most influences the lives of Palestinians is power politics. On the
international level, the weak position of Palestine makes it vulnerable to pressures from the
dominant power in the region (Israel) and the U.S. On the national level, the PA appropri-
ates the Islamic discourse and uses patriarchal and nationalist discourses as part of its
power politics to build its hegemony. The Islamists try to strengthen their hegemony by
using patriarchal and Islamic discourses as well as resistance against Israel as part of their
power politics. The difference between the PA and the Islamists, as will be argued in
Chapter 4, is the PA’s appropriation of the Islamic discourse. Both the PA and the Is-
lamists, as patriarchal institutions, suppress women to maintain their hegemony. The
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women’s movement cannot consider either of them as an ally, as will be elaborated later in
this study.
2.2 The concepts
2.2.1 Discourse
Discourse was chosen because it is a comprehensive tool for examining the mean-
ings underlying the actions and statements of various actors as well as the institutions and
structures of which they are a part. Michel Foucault, in his attempt to understand the rela-
tionship between language, social institutions, subjectivity and power, identifies discourses
as “historically variable ways of specifying knowledge and truth. They function as sets of
rules, and the operating of these rules and concepts in programs, which specify what is or
what is not the case” (Ramazanoglu, 1993:19).
Unlike structuralists, who understand discourse as “the study of smaller bits of lan-
guage such as sounds, parts of words, meanings, and the order of the words” (Tannen,
1998:1), Foucault considers it as having more than linguistic meaning. “It is material in the
sense that it is located in institutions and practices which define difference and shape the
material world, including bodies.” (Weedon, 1999:103). Thus, social meanings are pro-
duced within social institutions and practices in everyday life (Weedon, 1987).
Foucault’s question, then, is not about the source of discourses, or what interests
they represent, but what “effects of power and knowledge they ensure and what makes
their use necessary” (Ramazanoglu, 1993:19-20). Therefore, individuals who are shaped
by institutions “are agents of change, rather than its authors, change which may either
serve hegemonic interests or challenge existing power relations” (Weedon, 1987:25). That
makes the individual “the site for competing and often contradictory modes of subjectivity,
which together constitute a particular person” (Weedon, 1999:103).
In this sense, discourses determine the meaning of being a woman or a man and the
convenient range of gender-suitable and inappropriate behaviour. We learn how to think
and behave through discursive practices, which shape our bodies, minds, and emotions.
“Discourse does not reflect meaning and subjectivity, but rather it produces them,
and that makes language and subjectivity frequently a field of political struggle involving
both the defining and contesting of difference in discourses, which have different degrees
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of power to shape social relations” (Weedon, 1999:103). Therefore, “resistance to power
comes through new discourses producing new truths. These may be counter-discourses,
which oppose dominant truths, or reverse discourses” (Ramazanoglu, 1993:19-20). How-
ever, that does not mean that discourse is divided between the accepted discourse and the
excluded one. Discourse is a multiplicity of discursive elements that can come into play in
various strategies. It transmits and produces power; it reinforces it, but also undermines
and exposes it, renders it fragile and makes it possible to thwart it (Foucault, 1980). To
sum up, discourse is the universe where power is constituted. Thus, it cannot be captured
because it is everywhere.
By this definition, the discursive field of the law, for instance (since we are dis-
cussing the Family Law), has several discourses, but not all of them possess equal weight
or power. Some will justify the status quo, others will challenge the basis of the current
practices or institutions; however, such discourses are marginalized or dismissed by the
hegemonic system of meaning and practices by labelling them as irrelevant or bad
(Weedon, 1987). For example, the draft Basic Law for Palestinians ensures equal rights for
men and women (Palestinian National Authority, 1996). However, another article in the
Basic Law makes the Sharia the main source of legislation. The hegemonic culture of Is-
lam, Islamist power, and the PA’s patriarchal nature would give less weight to equal rights
for men and women than to the maintenance of Sharia as the main source of legislation.
Moreover, the legal devices in a society are not homogeneous; they depend upon
the groups that are involved in the legal procedures and performance (judges, the police,
lawyers, etc.). However, one set of discourses is dominant and reflects “particular values,
class” (Weedon, 1987:36) and gender interests. The views of dominant discourses about
what is ‘natural justice’ are different from those of the challenging discourses. For in-
stance, depriving mothers of custody over their children is ‘natural justice’ according to the
dominant discourse of Family Law, while the discourse of the women’s movement (which
is both a counter-discourse as well as a reverse discourse) seeks to move the hegemonic
discourse to “a position of relative powerlessness” (Weedon, 1987:37).
For marginal discourses such as the feminist one to have a social effect even when
they lack social power, they must at least be circulated and announced in order to offer dis-
cursive space to individuals who seek help in the face of the dominant discourse. The de-
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gree to which marginal discourses can increase their social power is controlled by the
broader context of social interests and power within which struggles with the dominant
discourse are formed (Weedon, 1987). Of course, the feminist discourse does not expect to
win the battle merely by raising its voice and declaring its challenge. In an environment of
patriarchal social relations, the power balance needs to be changed as well.
2.2.2 Power
Power was selected because relations in all societies are based on the relative
strengths of the actors. That makes power an obvious and necessary concept for use in this
analysis. This study uses Foucault’s conception of power as a moving set of force relations
that exist everywhere and all the time.
Foucault’s understanding of power is not as a set of institutions and mechanisms
that regulate the relation between the State and citizens, or as a mode of subjugation which
has the form of rules, or as a general system of domination exerted by one group over an-
other. He regards these as only the terminal forms of power. For Foucault, power must be
understood as
the multiplicity of force relations immanent in the sphere in which they operate
and which constitute their own organization; as the process which, through
ceaseless struggles and confrontations, transforms, strengthens, or reverses them;
as the support which these force relations find in one another, thus forming a
chain or a system, or on the contrary, the disjunctions and contradictions which
isolate them from one another’; and lastly, as the strategies in which they take ef-
fect, whose general design or institutional crystallization is embodied in the state
apparatus, in the formulation of the law, in the various social hegemonies. (Fou-
cault, 1980:92-3) [Italics added.]
In this definition, power is perceived not as a constant bloc located in some central
point, but as a moving substance of force relations, which, due to their inequalities, gener-
ate certain ranks of power. The second element of Foucault’s definition is his understand-
ing that force relations occur in an infinite process of mobility; therefore they are generated
in every moment and everywhere. Power is thus constantly present and it is everywhere.
“The essential question here – posed by many feminist critics of postmodernism –
is whether this means that we are mere passive effects of discourse, deprived of agency.
Post-structuralist feminists would answer in the negative, arguing that it is only by assum-
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ing forms of subjectivity, which include the dimension of agency, that we can think, com-
municate and act in the world” (Weedon, 1999:104).
Moreover, power relations are not located outside other types of relations, such as
economic processes or sexual relationships. Power relations are the immediate effect of the
inequalities in those relations. In this sense, power relations do not only play a repressive
role; on the contrary, they are productive wherever they come into play (Sawicki, 1991).
When we say that power relations are immanent and productive, we touch the most effec-
tive part of the subject. Because if power is only repressive, then how does it obtain “such
a grip on us? Why would we continue to obey a purely repressive and coercive form of
power?” (Sawicki, 1991: 21) For Foucault, power is repressive only in “its most frustrated
and extreme form. The need to resort to a show of force is more often evidence of a lack of
power (Sawicki, 1991:21).
The only framework within which this viewpoint makes sense is if power is defined
in terms of hegemony achieved through the consent of the population. Thus, absence of
consent (and therefore lack of power) necessitates the use of force to maintain hegemony.
However, from a different perspective on power, Foucault’s statement does not stand up. If
power is regarded as the ability to use force, then the use of force cannot be seen to indi-
cate a lack of power. Would we consider the state of Israel to be manifesting a lack of
power because of its violent use of force? If we generalized this argument, all the countries
that ignite war would be viewed as powerless, and all men’s violence against women
would be due to their powerlessness!
Foucault focuses on “how certain institutional and cultural practices produce indi-
viduals. Disciplinary power is exercised over the body and soul of the individual”
(Sawicki, 1991:22) in society by the dominant discourse. Although this increases the
power of individuals, it also renders them more docile (Karam, 1998). For instance, the
disciplinary (institutional) power that is exercised over women’s bodies is clear in the
Family  Law, which  represents  a masculine  discourse that  legitimizes  the domination of
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men and subordination of women.18 The disciplinary power is clear when we notice that
even the most radical women are not prepared to challenge the basis of this law as a mas-
culine discourse; they contest the legal provisions from within the framework of this mas-
culine law. “Disciplinary practices create the division” (Sawicki, 1991:22) between what is
considered right and wrong, of good/bad Muslim, of legal/criminal, which by “virtue of
their authoritative status, can be used as effective means of social normalization and social
control” (Sawicki, 1991:22). The wearing of the veil that is imposed by the Islamist parties
separates ‘good’ and ‘bad’ women, and maintains Islamist control by labelling that which
is different as abnormal.
Foucault’s ‘bottom-up’ analysis of power shows “how power relations at the micro
level of society facilitate certain global effects of domination, such as class power and pa-
triarchy” (Sawicki, 1991:23). Yet, according to Foucault, power also has the capability to
create resistance – not by the choice or decision of individuals, but because power that is
embodied in force relations based on inequalities naturally and inevitably arouses some
form of resistance.
Foucault conceives force relations as a network that runs through all the social
body; it takes shape and comes into play in the modes of production, familial relations, and
institutions. Then these force relations embrace the local oppositions and link them to-
gether in a series of arrangements that reflect the power relations in the social body at a
specific moment. The domination of a certain discourse (a patriarchal discourse in the Pal-
estinian case) is the outcome of these sustained confrontations between the opposing ele-
ments of force relations (Foucault, 1980).
In her book Women, Islamism and the State, Contemporary Feminists in Egypt,
Azza Karam analyzes a similar phenomenon in Egypt. She discusses the relations between
the State, Islamists, and the Egyptian feminists, and finds that
Power oscillates from one [player] to another in a series of reactions and contra-
dictions. Islamists’ power is a reaction to state power, as well as inherent to Is-
lamic dynamics in itself. The same is true in reference to the relationships between
Islamists and feminists, and between feminists and state. In fact, the power of Is-
                                                
18 For organization of gender and institutionalization of gender relationships on the basis of power relations,
see Scott (1996:169), who argues that gender is not only the primary field where power is articulated, it is
also the “persistent and recurrent way of enabling the signification of power in the Judeo-Christian as well as
Islamic traditions.” (Italics added.)
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lamists, state laws, and feminists lies in a complex interplay of resistance to each
other (Karam, 1998:3).
The position of the actors (whether the State, Islamists, or feminists) allows for di-
verse degrees and types of agency; sometimes agency is manifested as compliance with or
support to the dominant hegemonic power, “thus forming a chain or a system” (Foucault,
1980:92). However, at other times it takes the shape of resistance, “the disjunctions and
contradictions which isolate them from one another” (Foucault, 1980:92). In all cases, it
shows the “process which, through ceaseless struggles and confrontations, transforms,
strengthens, or reverses” the force relations between actors (Foucault, 1980:92).
Foucault‘s definition of power is useful for examining the mechanisms by which
power is exercised and the relations between powerful and powerless individuals. How-
ever, it is not enough by itself for an analysis of relations between the powerful and pow-
erless at the institutional level. Therefore, this study also uses Gramsci’s concept of he-
gemony to supplement the analysis. It will be kept in mind, however, that Gramsci is use-
ful for understanding power relations between two institutional actors but cannot be used
in a context of multiple conflicting discourses. In such a situation, Foucault is more rele-
vant.
2.2.3 Hegemony
Karl Marx was the first to use the concept of hegemony in the context of historical
materialism, with reference to the interests of the ruling class being presented as ideal uni-
versal interests. According to Marx, when the ruling class comes to power it serves a broad
range of interests; but in the course of time, as contradictions develop with other classes,
the specific interests of the ruling class become apparent and the stratagem of identifying
its interests with the common good is used increasingly in attempts to paper over the con-
tradictions.
Gramsci builds on this notion of hegemony when he recognizes civil society as the
major vehicle for bourgeois hegemony. He locates hegemony as operating at the ‘private’
or non-State levels of the superstructure, and he distinguishes this social hegemony from
the use of force as the principal means of maintaining social order. Cultural hegemony,
which is generally identified as the major dimension of this ‘manipulation’, involves the
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production of ways of thinking and seeing, and of excluding alternative visions and dis-
courses. Hegemony, in brief, is the manufacturing of consent (Marshall, 1998).
This conception of hegemony leads Gramsci to expand his definition of the State to
include not only the governmental apparatuses and coercive mechanisms, but also “the un-
derpinnings of the political structure in civil society … the church, the educational system,
the media; all the institutions [that help] to create in people certain modes of behaviour and
expectations consistent with the hegemonic social order” (Cox, 1993:51). The hegemony
of a dominant group thus bridges the conventional categories of State and civil society.
Hence, hegemony is the ability of a social group to exercise a function of political
and moral direction in society; for hegemony to succeed, it should be acknowledged by
other social groups, they have to appreciate the hegemonic group’s leading role. The lead-
ing group’s power is something more than and different from ‘dominance’. Gramsci de-
fines it as the “combination of consent and coercion” (Arrighi, 1993:149) (Italics added.)
to the extent that when “the consensual aspect of power is in the forefront; hegemony pre-
vails” (Cox, 1993:52). “Coercion implies the use of force or the credible threat thereof;
consent implies moral leadership” (Arrighi, 1993:149).
To sum up Gramsci’s viewpoint, the process of attaining hegemony involves both
attaining consent and using force as necessary, with both allies and opponents. As will be
seen later, this method of attaining hegemony is practised by the Palestinian Authority. It is
also important to note that hegemony is a historical concept; it is a process which is never
fixed forever in time.
Charlie Bertsch (1995) links hegemony with the construction of identity in society.
In an interesting article on the Internet, she successfully uses the concept of hegemony to
reflect on identity construction, finding that Gramsci’s description of hegemony is signifi-
cant in this context in two ways. Firstly, hegemony acts as a “kind of cultural ‘glue’ which
is able to bind and hold together very different sectors of modern societies, even ones that
have little or nothing in common”(Bertsch, 1995:4). Secondly, hegemony resolves real dif-
ferences into a semblance of unity by creating and sustaining an illusion. It makes possible
the perception of conflicting sectors as somehow alike, sharing a common identity. He-
gemony thus creates a fiction of collective identity. This is evocative of the Marxian de-
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scription of how a ruling class tries to hide the contradictions between its interests and
those of other classes.
In this connection, Althusser (cited in Bertsch, 1995:4) argues that “there is no es-
cape from ideology. Ideology represents the imaginary relationship of individuals to their
real conditions of existence. Because our minds always mediate our relation to reality”, we
have no ability to have direct access to it. Therefore, it is only through socially constructed
fictions that we define ourselves and our place in the world. Bertsch notes that if we cannot
escape from ideology in general, that means there is a lot at stake in determining which
specific ideologies dominate our lives. Since hegemony depends on the creation of a col-
lective fiction of identity, only a “specific ideology can hold sway over the majority of
people in a society” (Bertsch, 1995:5) at any one time. This approach can be used as a
point of departure to analyze the dominant ideology in Palestinian society in order to
strengthen the alternative (counter-) hegemony. This alternative hegemony needs to con-
struct an ideology adequate to its own political project.
Bertsch’s contribution is helpful in analyzing the strong cultural hegemony of Is-
lamic ideology in Palestinian society. As mentioned earlier, discourse, too, does not reflect
meaning and subjectivity, but rather produces them. This makes subjectivity (or identity in
Bertsch’s terms) a field of frequent political struggle involving both the defining and con-
testing of differences in discourses (which appeared as hegemony and counter-hegemony
by Gramsci and Bertsch).
Karam (1998) uses this identification in her analysis of the relation between the
Egyptian State and the Islamists:
The relation between the state and the Islamists is a dynamic one, which involves
periods of covert encouragement on the one hand, and severe repression on the
other. It is the consent of the state to allow the dominance of an Islamic discourse
by participating and employing it, and the implied consent of some Islamists to
work within state structures and institutions. The encouragement takes place at a
time when Islamist activity can prove useful as a means to reach the ends of the
state in terms of consolidating its ideological hegemony. When these groups are
seen to ‘overstep the tolerance afforded by the state, then a severe cycle of repres-
sion starts (Karam, 1998:25).
The struggle between the two groups is seen in terms of discourses involving power and
hegemony. For the Egyptian State, it is an action to sustain power and hegemony, while in
the case of the Islamists, it is a battle to acquire political power and develop their counter-
hegemony.
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When the use of force is too risky and the exercise of moral leadership is problem-
atic, ‘corruption’ and ‘fraud’ may temporarily step in as surrogates of power. Thus, “cor-
ruption and fraud are tactical weapons in a rearguard struggle to preserve power. They are
expressions, not of power, but of a failure of power. [However,] hegemony, in contrast, is
the additional power that accrues to a dominant group by virtue of its capacity to pose on a
universal plane all the issues around which conflict rages” (Arrighi, 1993:149).(Italics
original.)
Here we notice the difference between Foucault’s and Gramsci’s conceptualiza-
tions. For Foucault, the use of force indicates lack of power, while Gramsci considers co-
ercion an essential component of leading-group power. Gramsci advances his analysis a
step forward by assigning another element: it is with corruption and fraud that the leading
group expresses its lack of power.
Another important aspect of hegemony identified by Gramsci is the inability of a
group to become hegemonic unless it understands its own interests and aspirations. The
group also has to retain an ability to respond to its allies’ interests and motivations derived
from their position in society. If the hegemonic group neglects its allies’ interests, it will
eventually fail and be replaced either by force or by a true ‘ethical’ hegemony (Augelli and
Murphy, 1993).
In this regard, Gramsci’s conception of the State contrasts with the “narrowly de-
fined ‘night watchman’ State of liberal economists and the ‘interventionist’ State associ-
ated with Bismarck” (Gill and Law, 1993:93). The State dominates not through sanctions,
punishments or inducements; but by providing ‘intellectual and moral leadership’ (Gram-
sci, 1971 cited in Gill and Law, 1993:93). Hegemony is exercised within a wider social
and political constellation of forces, or what he called the ‘historical bloc’. This concept
refers to a historical conformity between material forces, institutions and ideologies. In a
process which is almost like constructing a discourse, a successful ‘historical bloc’ should
be politically organized around a set of hegemonic ideas, providing strategic direction and
coherence to the constituent elements. The role of intellectuals becomes essential. As
Gramsci stresses, intellectuals are needed to supply intellectual and moral support to the
hegemony’s dominant political role, to the point where “what is ‘politics’ to the productive
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[and potentially hegemonic] class becomes ‘rationality’ to the intellectual class” (Gramsci,
1975 cited in Gill, 1993:131).
Therefore, for counter-hegemony to win, it has to confront the hegemonic group at
every level. “For a new historical bloc to emerge, its leaders must engage in ‘conscious,
planned struggle’; [it should] not only have power within the civil society and economy,
[but] it also needs persuasive ideas and arguments which build on and catalyze its political
networks and organization” (Gill and Law, 1993:93).
2.2.4 Power politics
Power politics is a useful tool for analyzing relations between dominant and subor-
dinate powers, especially at the international level. It explains how one actor uses power to
influence or compel another actor. It was chosen for its capacity to explain the political
changes in the Middle East that led to the Oslo agreement and the emergence of the Pales-
tinian Authority as one of the main actors in Palestinian society. It is also linked with the
concept of hegemony. Power politics is a frequently used term in international relations. It
suggests relationships between independent powers, and implies that there are independent
political units (states) and that there are continuous and organized relationships between
them (Bull and Holbraad, 1979). However, in this study it stands for the conduct of inter-
national relations through force or the threat of force, without considering rights and jus-
tice. This meaning is especially relevant in the Middle East, where the experience of four
wars in a relatively short period of time has inextricably linked power politics with the use
of force.
At the heart of any study of international relations, there must be the question of
how competing demands within and between different states can be resolved. The tools
used in the discipline of international relations to provide an answer to this question are the
concepts of power and influence. Power at the international level is defined as “the capac-
ity of a nation to use its tangible and intangible resources in such a way as to affect the be-
haviour of other nations” (Anderson, 1996:13). Anderson observes that ‘power’ is always
perceived as one country having the capacity to compel another country to act in a way it
does not want to act. In contrast, influence is defined as “the ability to get someone to do
something you want via simple persuasion rather than the implicit or explicit threat of or
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use of sanctions” (Anderson, 1996:14). He cites the ability of the U.S. to force Israel to
negotiate with the PLO because of the political strength derived from its military success
in the Gulf war as an example of this definition of power.
However, it could equally be argued that the Arab countries were in a weak posi-
tion after the Gulf war and the defeat of the Iraqi forces. (This was also true of Saudi Ara-
bia, which, while appearing stronger, was crippled financially). Therefore, the so-called
peace process was established on the basis of a substantial power imbalance between the
Arabs and the Israelis. This made it easier for the Israelis to give in to U.S. pressure to ne-
gotiate with the PLO.
If politics in international relations (and to a certain extent in national relations as
well) is defined as a struggle for power, then the next question is, what are the elements of
power? Holsti (1983, cited in Stoll and Ward, 1989:2) sees power as being made up of
“three elements: capabilities, acts and responses. Capabilities are resources that can be
used by one actor to influence another. Acts are the processes and relationships with which
an actor influences another. Responses are the actions of the target of the influence at-
tempt”. Thus, in international relations, to “say a state is powerful may mean that: (1) The
state has a large amount of resources for use in influence attempts. (2) The state is under-
taking a large number of actions to influence other actors. (3) The targets respond in a
manner consistent with the desires of the state making the influence attempt” (Stoll and
Ward, 1989:2).
It is interesting to see how this compares with Foucault’s conception of power. As
we saw earlier, Foucault defines power as, among other things, “the process which,
through ceaseless struggles and confrontations, transforms, strengthens or reverses force
relations”. This summarizes the final two elements in Holsti’s definition of power. How-
ever, an important component of Foucault’s conception is that power is not located in some
stable, central point. It is the constant interaction of force relations that defines it. On the
other hand, Holsti’s first element of power (resources) implies that power usually resides
in a specific location. This would apply even if the material resources that constitute that
power were geographically dispersed. Thus, the power of a state could reside in the legis-
lative and/or executive branches of government, no matter where its material resources
came from (of course, providing it had the capability to ensure an uninterrupted supply of
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those resources). Thus, while Foucault’s analysis of power can be used to explain interac-
tions within countries, it is insufficient for analysis in the context of international relations.
The power of the U.S. in the Middle East is obviously rooted in the elements defined by
Holsti.
2.2.5 Nationalism
Nationalism has increasingly occupied a central place in gender debates, for it re-
conceptualizes women’s relations to states and nations. The re-examination of ethnicity,
nationhood and citizenship within the gender focus has resulted in highlighting important
and marginalized aspects of these issues. Sometimes nationalism is applied with reference
to citizenship and state building, at other times in relation to ethnicity. However, most of
the time it is connected with consciousness, aspirations and sentiments. Nationalism is
such a strong force that it has even been called the new religion, or replacement for relig-
ion (James, 1996).
Feminists have discussed the concept critically with reference to the public/private
distinction and women’s being deprived of their rights, or discrimination against women in
general. Yuval-Davis (1997) observes that nationalist projects and gender relations influ-
ence each other in different contexts. Gender is fundamental to the development of culture,
nationalism, and social and political movements, for it is in the name of the ‘nation’ that
the position of women has often suffered. National unity is used to rationalize postpone-
ment of the solution of women’s problems. “Priority is thus given again and again to other
problems and excludes both popular demands and women’s claim for a better status in
their society” (Helie-Lucas, 1993:6). “The time for women’s demands is never
now”(Helie-Lucas, 1993:9).
The arguments surrounding this concept are many and space limitations do not
permit their exploration here. Therefore, this discussion will confine itself to a general
definition, major debates, specifically the feminist critique, and finally a focused reflection
on Palestinian nationalism and its relation to the gender question.
Nationalism appears to be viewed from a deterministic perspective. Gellner (1983,
cited in Yuval-Davis, 1992) regards history as a succession of technologies, each generat-
ing a specific socio-political order. In this context, nationalism is the style of politics best
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suited to current industrial societies because it needs homogenous languages and culture in
order to be effective. Therefore, where nationalism does not exist, it is necessary to invent
it. According to Friedland (cited in Hiltermann, 1991:11), “Even when there is no sense of
nationhood before the establishment of the colony, colonialism creates it,” in the sense that
it stimulates resistance from the colonized people which the national movement later uses
to construct the nationalist discourse. Hroch (1993) believes that the idea of nationalism
has never in itself moved anyone. It takes hold only in a constitutive medium in which it
has meaning, not because the idea cannot be profoundly influential, but because it needs
intellectuals to invent national communities. This, of course, assumes that certain objective
preconditions for the formation of a nation already exist. Hroch’s view of nationalism is
accepted in this study because nationalism cannot exist as an abstract idea; it is a con-
structed discourse.
Yuval-Davis (1992:2) concurs that the nationalist discourse involves a political
project; a claim for separate political representation which takes the form of a claim for a
separate autonomous ‘nation-state’. She is critical of Gellner’s definition of nationalism as
a
… theory of political legitimacy which requires that ethnic boundaries should not
cut across political ones, and in particular, that ethnic boundaries within a given
state … should not separate the power holders from the rest … and therefore state
and culture must be linked (Gellner, 1983 cited in Yuval-Davis, 1992:3).
Yuval-Davis (1992) notes that the definition excludes minorities (and, indeed, women)
from important power resources, and that there is no place in the world where such a ‘pure’
nation-state exists. She also disagrees with the historical typology of Smith (1971, cited in
Yuval-Davis, 1992), which differentiates between two types of national projects: the ‘eth-
nic-genealogical’ and the ‘civic-territorial’. Yuval-Davis regards Smith’s dichotomous di-
vision between culture-nation and state-nation as one that conflates origin and culture. Ac-
cording to her, a diversity of national projects constitute dimensions of national ideology.
Therefore, she differentiates between the state-nation, culture-nation, and folk-nation. In
other words, she differentiates between national ideologies that focus on citizenship of a
specific state (in specific territories), those that focus on specific cultures (or religions),
and finally those that are constructed around the specific origin of the people (or their
race). Then she argues that all of them could be connected with racist exclusion. In later
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analysis this study will use Yuval-Davis’ concept, especially with regard to how the Is-
lamist discourse identifies women with the ‘other’ in order to exclude them.
2.2.5.1 Nationalism and women’s position
This section will analyze the linkages between nationalist projects and women’s
oppression. It will examine how gender relations, and particularly the position of women,
are affected by the project of nationhood.
Feminists who tackle the subject “seek to understand why women are ‘hidden’ in
the theorization on nationalist phenomena” (Yuval-Davis, 1997:2). The construction of
gender roles has always been influenced by the articulation of nationalism. Kandiyoti
(1997) argues that the integration of women into modern ‘nationhood’ follows a different
trajectory from that of men. For instance, the protection of women’s ‘sexuality’ constitutes
a “crucial distinction between the nation and its ‘others’” (1997:8).
Yuval-Davis (1997) relates gender to class, ethnicity and the State, arguing that
each of these variables shapes, and is shaped by, the others in concrete social relations. She
suggests that these categories have been constructed according to varying historical con-
texts. Three interlocking domains influence gender relations: the State, civil society and the
family. Each sphere has its own ideological context and access to economic and political
resources. These domains are heterogeneous in their nature and have different meanings
for different ethnic groups, for classes, and for men and women. The relations of the family
and civil society with the State are thus not homogeneous, and are refracted through a
complex web of social, political and economic power relations.
Examining the concept of citizenship, Yuval-Davis argues that gender relations are
closely linked to citizenship rights.19 Citizenship determines the notion of ‘otherness’ be-
tween individuals and genders. She sees it as primarily a political construct, operating as
an exclusive and inclusive category defining the relationship between the State and the
citizens.  The type of State  determines the  rights and  duties of the individuals and groups
                                                
19 Walby (1996:246) notes that in the First World countries, political citizenship was granted to women sev-
eral decades later than to men. In contrast, in the Third World, “women won the franchise at the same time as
men, at the moment of national independence from the colonial power.” It would appear that Walby’s con-
cept of political citizenship is confined to the right to vote.
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within it. She illustrates her argument by referring to the situation of Palestinian women
living in Israel: to define their citizenship, we have to study their membership in the Israeli
Palestinian community (class, religion, location, abilities, stage of lifecycle), and that of
the Israeli Palestinian community in relation to Israel as well as in relation to other Pales-
tinian and Arab communities. In addition, the positioning of both Israel and the ‘Arabs’
internationally is also relevant.
To take Yuval-Davis’ argument further, we also need to examine the relations be-
tween the state of Israel and the Palestinians living in the occupied territories. If citizenship
is about legal, social and political rights, it can be argued that the state of Israel, as an oc-
cupier, considers Palestinians ‘less human’, for it deprives them of their full human rights.
Such an attitude towards Palestinians in the occupied territories is bound to be reflected in
the issue of the citizenship of Palestinian women living in Israel.
The spheres of family and civil society relate in different ways to notions of citi-
zenship and nation-making. Yuval-Davis argues that in most pre-industrial states and some
countries in the contemporary period, kinship ties often form the foundation for political
alignments in which women have few rights. In other cases, genealogical ties provide the
major reason for pushing some women into the political hot seat. Then she concludes that
political rights are the most important, and that social enabling or ‘empowerment’ is neces-
sary to make them meaningful:
Citizenship rights are anchored in both political and social domains. Without ‘ena-
bling’ social conditions, political rights are vacuous. At the same time, citizenship
rights without obligations also construct people as passive and dependent. Citizens’
most important duty is, therefore, to exercise their political rights and to participate
in the determination of their collectivities’, state’, and societies’ trajectories (Yuval-
Davis, 1997:92). (Italics added.)
Walby (1996) agrees with Yuval-Davis. She argues that political citizenship [in the
West] was the basis of the transformation from private to public patriarchy, and suggests
that women would not be able to practise their civil and social rights without attaining their
political rights. However, this study agrees with Longo (1999) when she challenges the
concepts of ‘politics’ and ‘citizenship’, as they are not neutral. She argues that for women
to attain political rights, they have to strip ‘politics’ and political culture of its masculinist
authority. Women’s movements must propose a new definition of citizenship; they need to
“present a new image of citizenship that includes both political and social aspects, [and]
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which responds to the needs and demands of women and takes into account gender, class,
and ethnic differences in a pluralistic framework (Longo, 1999: 2).
2.2.5.2 Nationalism and culture
Gender relations are significant cultural and political markers of nationhood, for as
Kandiyoti (1997) argues, women could simultaneously participate actively in, and become
hostage to, nationalist projects. In the Third World generally, a distinction has been built
into nationalist ideology around a separation of the domain of culture into two spheres –
the material and the spiritual (Chatterjee, 1989). It has been argued that the West is able to
dominate and subjugate Third World countries because of its scientific and technological
strength and rational forms of economic organization. To overcome this subjugation, the
Third World must learn these superior techniques. However, some nationalists emphasize
that such learning should not be allowed to ‘contaminate’ the spiritual domain of their
countries.
Chatterjee argues that nationalist discourse shows a clear dichotomy between the
outside and the inside: the material domain lies outside us and is ultimately unimportant. It
is the spiritual that lies within our true self which should be secured. When this distinction
is applied, we discover that the inside is the domain of the home/private/family, while the
outside is the world/public/male. The private/home has to be preserved ‘uninfected’ by the
material world; and women are apparently representatives of the private.20 The nationalist
discourse in fact supplies an ideological principle of selection. It is not a dismissal of mod-
ernity; rather, it is an attempt to make modernity consistent with the nationalist project.
For Palestinian men in the occupied territories, the world/public was a place of op-
pression and daily demoralization, where the Israeli military rules had to be obeyed. It was
a place where the Palestinian man experienced his worst humiliations. At the same time, it
was the place of struggle and daily fight; it was a battle to free the homeland. Enloe (cited
in Walby, 1996:241) comments that “nationalist movements have typically sprung from
masculinized memory, masculinized humiliation and masculinized hope”. However, it is
                                                
20 This distinction between public and private has been the subject of a long discussion among feminists.
Walby (1996) argues against the conflation of ‘private’ with ‘family’. For her, private means the individual’s
autonomy; thus the family is not ‘private’ for women.
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still a ‘safe’ battle as long as the men have the ability to protect their homes/private
sphere/women/honour, etc. For Palestinian men, the memories of the 1948 Dayr Yasin
village massacre and 1982 Sabra-Shatila massacre in Beirut, provide enough lessons. In
both massacres, the targets were women and children.21 This was a deliberate tactic to de-
moralize the Palestinian men because they could not protect the great number of civil-
ians.22
Abdulhadi (1994) argues that in the last few years (especially in the Intifada), the
promotion of patriarchal dominance and traditional values of honour and modesty by con-
servative groups has played into hands of the Israeli intelligence apparatus: the military
occupation authorities have been able to coerce some women into collaboration by black-
mailing them with photographs covertly taken in ‘compromising’ locales such as hair sa-
lons. In her view, this challenges traditional definitions of morality and raises the question
of social versus political priorities: is it more important to preserve family honour or to re-
sist the presence of Israel in Palestine? However, that is not the correct question to ask. The
important questions are: How do we analyze the Islamists’ discourse? How do we examine
the effective means by which they use the occupiers’ practices to build their hegemonic
power in Palestinian society? The Islamist discourse is one of honour and shame, relying
on the traditional definition of manhood that associates masculinity with ‘national
strength’.23 It is operated to establish power over the secular parties and to exclude Pales-
tinian women from public life and send them back home. It is the protectors’ discourse,
exactly mirroring the practices of the Israeli security forces. It helps the Islamist parties to
                                                
21 The difficult protector/protected relationship constructs the male as citizen-warrior, and women (and chil-
dren) as needing protection. The male attitude to women moves from protected through possession to con-
trol. Women become vulnerable to socially accepted violence from men in their own-group if they appear
rebellious or if the burden of protection becomes threatening to the men. Those who are unable to protect
their women can be feminized as not real men (Roberts, 1984; Runyan, 1990; Gibson, 1993 cited in Pettman,
1996).
22 Peteet (1991) indicates that the Israelis deliberately exploited Palestinian cultural norms in this way for
purposes of intimidation.
23 Pettman (1996) says the nationalists frequently represent the nation as a woman under threat of penetration
or domination, so her sons must sacrifice for her safety and honour. It is noticeable that an association has
been built up between the colonized nation and the female body on one hand, and the imperial power and
male heterosexual rape on the other.
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exhibit their ‘capacity’ to take over the role of real protectors of the nation’s honour.24 The
leftist and secular parties are portrayed as having less honour, being less masculine and
less nationalist, because of their liberal ideas about women’s emancipation. However, even
the leftists accepted the Islamists’ restrictions on women’s participation in the public
struggle, citing the need to maintain ‘national unity against Israeli’.
2.2.6 Patriarchy
Patriarchy is prevalent in Palestine as already shown in section 1.4. Therefore, this
concept is used to determine to what extent it affects alliance building between the PA and
the Islamists. Much has been written about the concept of patriarchy by feminist authors.
The concept revolves around two themes: patriarchy as male dominance characteristic of
society, and patriarchy as an autonomous system. Fox (1988) criticizes the reductionist ap-
proach, which links the social structure based on patriarchal relations with the innate male
desire for power. She argues that to analyze patriarchy we have to integrate processes of
generational reproduction at all levels: the level of the individual’s reproduction in daily
life through housework and mother work, as well as the level of producing gender identity
and ideology. More importantly, in order to analyze gender inequalities, we should make a
linkage between the level of the social structure and the level of the individual.
Eisenstein defines patriarchy as
the process of politically differentiating the female from the male, as women and
men. Patriarchy in this sense is the politics of transforming biological sex into
politicized gender, which prioritizes the man while making the woman different
(unequal), less than, or the ‘other’. This process of differentiating woman from
man while establishing the privilege of men operates partially on the level of ide-
ology that centers the phallus in the series of symbols, signs, and language while
dividing the private world from the public world. And it simultaneously estab-
lishes the sexual division of labor, the distinctness of family and market, patriar-
chal controls within the market, and so on (Eisenstein, 1984:90 cited in Fox, 1988:
175-76).
This definition, as Fox (1988) notes, gives the political arena a meaning of social structure
and a division of social life into public and private, which institutionalizes the division of
                                                
24 Scott (1996), analyzing the Islamist’s discourse in Iran, notes that the emergent rulers (the Khomeini re-
gime) legitimized domination, strength, central authority and ruling power as masculine (while enemies, out-
siders, subversives, and weakness were feminine); and made that code literal in law by forbidding women
from participating in politics. She argues that the State has nothing to gain from the control of women. How-
ever, such control is exercised for the construction and consolidation of power.
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labour by sex. Fox seems unsatisfied with the conceptualization of patriarchy as just de-
fining the social structure; she believes that patriarchy has to be understood as production
and reproduction of people, which involves the family primarily but not exclusively. She
then summarizes her argument:
[The] conceptions of male-female differences correspond to those of the distinc-
tion between public and private and originate not only in the family’s creation of
subjectivity, but also in an ideology that is sustained (if not created) by the state.
… it is the production of gendered subjectivity, and the gendered subjectiv-
ity/ideology itself to which ‘patriarchy’ can be seen to refer (Fox, 1988:177).
It is this definition that fits the conceptualization of discourse and power in this
study. Patriarchy as a discourse does not reflect our subjectivity as men and women, but
rather it produces them; it produces gendered individuals with different degrees of power.
At the same time, individuals are not just victims of patriarchal discourse; they also pro-
duce it, reproduce it, and change it. In spite of this strong agency, however, individuals
cannot do away with it.
Patriarchy as a discourse is located in the patriarchal institutions (for example,
family and State) and practices (for example, gender- and sex-based discrimination) that
define differences between women and men and shape the material world of production
and reproduction. Patriarchy is to be found in the legal, social and religious spheres. As
mentioned in the analysis of power, patriarchal relations work at both the micro and macro
levels of society. They facilitate male dominance and female subordination in patriarchal
society. Thus, Foucault can be used to analyze patriarchy at the micro level, while Gramsci
can be used for analysis at the macro level. However, in this study, there is no analysis of
patriarchy at the family level and so Foucault’s concept is not used in the context of patri-
archy.
Moghadam (1993) outlines the main features of patriarchal relations in the Middle
East: restrictive ways of behaviour for women, rigid gender segregation, and a powerful
ideology linking family honour to female virtue. Control over women’s bodies is important
as they are “regarded as a potential source of fitna – that is, moral disorder” (Moghadam,
1993:108). The social and economic changes in the Middle Eastern countries have influ-
enced patriarchal relations. Specifically, the modernity discourse, industrialization, and the
emergence of the nuclear family have affected patriarchal relations.
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In Palestine, patriarchal relations intensified during the Israeli occupation due to
several elements (Abdu, 1987 cited in Moghadam, 1993). The most important was the
transformation of male Palestinians from peasants to proletarians working in the Israeli
labour market. In the peasant economy, the family was the main unit of production and re-
production; however, when the men started working outside, an exclusive division was
created between production (public) and reproduction (private). This strengthened patriar-
chal relations inside the family.
Patriarchy was solidified at the national level by the PA, as shown by Abdu (1999),
who notes that the PA is very much a rule of one person, the president, who not only con-
trols the interior and exterior ministries, and the security forces and police, but also heads
the Executive Authority. The president is responsible for all high-level appointments,
which gives him a degree of concentrated control. This enables him to appoint people for
reasons that have little to do with qualifications or experience, or even in some cases with
the real need for the position itself. It is quite clear that the appointments are usually made
on the basis of affiliation to Fatah (the leading party) or clan allegiance. Furthermore,
many women have been appointed to governmental positions by virtue of their member-
ship of the Fatah movement or through the assistance of their relatives or friends in the PA.
Nepotism is nowadays a widespread phenomenon in PA institutions: it is a normal out-
come of the high importance given to family ties and clan loyalties. Therefore, the number
of women in the government should not be seen as a sign of their qualifications or gender
sensitivity on the part of the PA. As Yuval-Davis (1997) argues, in most pre-industrial so-
cieties, familial ties provide the major reason for pushing some women into the political
hot seat.
This trend has contributed to the consolidation of extended family rule and has re-
versed the tendency that was consolidated during the Intifada, one that gave prominence to
political affiliation over tribal or clan membership. It is obvious that the strengthening of
the role of patriarchy by empowering the clan and tribe has implications for women’s po-
sition in society. Abdu (1999) mentions that this trend affects women negatively. For ex-
ample, in “the cases of domestic violence, when the male head of a family is seen as the
guardian of the family’s female members, it becomes more difficult for women’s organi-
zations and NGOs … to intervene” (Abdu, 1999:41). This supports the argument by Pett-
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man (1996) that there is a connection between social control and violence against women,
and between these and the wider structures of gendered power.
3 THE MODEL PARLIAMENT EXPERIENCE
3.1 Introduction
This chapter describes the main features of the MP, its main demands, and most
importantly the main elements of the debate among the MP members. The debate revolved
around the competing discourses in Palestinian society.25 Some members pointed out that
tactics should be devised in the context of the real strength and popularity of the Islamic
discourse, and suggested using verses of the Quran26 and parts of the Hadith (the sayings
of the Prophet) that support the feminist cause but which are ignored by the dominant in-
terpretation of the Quran. Some other members said that such new interpretation would
employ the same selective methodology as that of the dominant Islamic institutions.
Moreover, they said, the issue is not so much one of interpretation as of power relations;
feminists interpreters of Islam would never have more authority than the male dominated
institutions.
The chapter also presents the main components of the Family Law in Palestine and
its discrimination against women. The last section outlines the debate among the MP
members about the proper approach to reforming the Family Law.
3.2 The structure of the MP
The Palestinian Model Parliament was a networking project between a number of
human rights centres, women's centres, and women's coalitions. It was established in 1997
with the aim of bringing together all parties interested in proposing Palestinian laws and
legislation based on equality and human rights. A preparatory committee was established
                                                
25 Although the discussion in the MP was about legal issues, it was necessary to refer to discourses in all
spheres of Palestinian society, including religion, culture, politics, etc.
26 The Quran is the holy book of Islam and its text is considered to be the words of God as revealed to the
Prophet by an angel.
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to draft the strategies and goals of the project. The implementing organization is the
Women’s Centre for Legal Aid and Counselling (WCLAC).27
The Model Parliament began with planning sessions in all regions of the West
Bank and Gaza. The activities resulted in the election of 88 members in the West Bank and
120 members in the Gaza Strip. The parliamentary seats were divided equally between
men and women. The participants were representatives of political parties, members of the
Legislative Council, human rights activists, representatives of women’s organizations and
grass-roots organizations, as well as some mullahs and members of Islamist parties. Sev-
eral meetings were held in a ‘parliamentary atmosphere’ in which the laws and regulations
were discussed and amended. Members of the Model Parliament participated in central
sessions towards the end of the MP project. The MP conducted several training courses
and workshops on current laws and regulations and international law for its members in
several regions in Palestine. It also gave training in lobbying and campaigning techniques.
The MP’s activities were financed by the British Council in Palestine and the Dutch fund-
ing agency (Novib).
3.3 Main elements of the debate in the MP
In order to provide the MP participants with the opportunity to debate women’s
rights from different perspectives, the trainers conducted a series of training sessions and
workshops. The training sessions were on human rights and included contemporary read-
ings in religious thought dealing with women's rights and the position of women in Islamic
legislation. The training sessions compared the findings of Muslim thinkers from many
different periods and regions. In these discussions, participants distinguished between re-
ligion and religious thought, religion being the Quran, religious thought being human in-
terpretation of the Quran. In discussing the Islamic doctrines on which the subordination of
women is based, most of the MP participants agreed that human attempts and opinions are
always subject to debate. However, some Muslims, especially those engaged in political
Islam, consciously confuse their interests with Quranic verses. They search for justifica-
tions of their objectives in fragmentary and gender-biased interpretation of Quranic verses.
                                                
27 Unfortunately, some of the documents produced by WCLAC in the run-up to the MP were unavailable in
The Netherlands and so could not be used for this study.
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The members of the MP were all conscious of the fact that the issues before them
were basically a matter of power relations. Thus, their problem was to find solutions that
would help to build a new, more-balanced equation which would strengthen the feminists
discourse while keeping the realities of Palestinian society in mind.
There were two main approaches to doing this. Some participants argued that the
Islamists should be confronted on their own ground and challenged on the basis of new and
progressive readings and interpretations of the Quran. They called for a feminist interpre-
tation of the Quran as a way to strengthen the feminist discourse.
The second viewpoint came from some ‘secular’ members in the MP; who said that
Islam’s position on women’s rights in general is ambiguous at best; and that Islam’s com-
patibility with women’s rights cannot be easily resolved. They added that the Quran would
have to be read selectively and subjectively to find supportive verses, and thus the feminist
interpreters would use the same methodology as the dominant religious institutions. Fur-
thermore, the feminist interpreters would have fewer texts to support their perspective,
while the ‘traditional’ Islamic school of thought has at its disposal an arsenal from the
mainstream of the Islamic heritage. In addition, they described women’s battle within Is-
lam as a losing one, not only because Islamic texts contain clear ideas of male superiority,
but also because the authority of feminist interpreters of Islam would never be greater than
that of the male-dominant institutions.
These members also argued that efforts to comb through Islamic texts for evidence
of sympathy for women would be unfruitful from the ‘liberal’ viewpoint. Their strong ar-
gument was that women’s struggle for their rights should be seen as a political struggle
within the power structure of society and that any attempt to obscure this fact would serve
the opposition. Therefore, the battle should be conducted politically, taking into account
the power relations of society and the dominant patriarchal relations in every aspect of life
in Palestine and in the Islamic world in general.
In terms of religious practice, this ‘secular’ group called for personal choice at both
public and private levels, but not as a body of personal status laws imposed on all members
of society. They strongly argued, with historical evidence, that if the MP members com-
promised their rights and strategies, then the chances of democratization and gender equal-
ity would be damaged.
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3.4 Central sessions
Because Palestine has been ruled by different powers, Palestinians are governed by
different laws in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The laws in the West Bank are based
on the Jordanian legal system, while those in the Gaza Strip are based on the Egyptian le-
gal system. This made it necessary for two central sessions to be held, one in the West
Bank (on 28-29 March 1998) and the other in the Gaza Strip (on 25-26 April 1998). Par-
ticipants agreed on the need to amend and unify the civil laws in the West Bank and the
Gaza Strip. The West Bank session focused on the legal status of Palestinian women and
ways of improving women’s conditions, taking into consideration the fact that women’s
rights are an integral part of human rights. The session in the West Bank was devoted to
discussion of women’s political and civil rights, including penal legislation and the rights
to work, education and health care.
Unlike the session in the West Bank, the one in Gaza exclusively discussed the Pal-
estinian Family Status Laws and ways to amend them in a spirit of equality, non-
discrimination and respect for women's human rights. Participants found through textual
analysis that certain articles in some laws supported unjust treatment of and discrimination
against women and represented a barrier to women's participation in developing their
country. These laws were also discussed in relation to the Palestinian Declaration of Inde-
pendence of 1988, which seeks to found the Palestinian nation on the basis of justice,
equality and respect for human rights. The debate over the laws is discussed later in this
chapter.
At the end of its central session, the MP in Gaza published a press release to clarify
its stand following the Islamists’ huge counter-campaign. The press release listed the main
demands of the MP and declared that the achievements and recommendations of the Cen-
tral Model Parliament should by no means be the last stage in the campaign. It affirmed the
need for further efforts at all levels to bring the campaign to its desired end – amendment
of the civil laws as an essential step in achieving a society built on the principles of justice,
equality and the rule of law. The press release called on everyone who disagreed with the
MP to discussion the issues on the basis of mutual respect, not closed-mind claims of ab-
solute truth. It also called on all those who questioned the MP’s objectives to avoid dema-
gogic rhetoric and engage in rational dialogue.
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The press release emphasized the fact that Palestine, Palestinian society, and relig-
ion in general belong to all Palestinians and no one has the right to claim the ownership of
absolute truth. Finally, it declared that the achievements and accomplishments of the Pal-
estinian Model Parliament represented only one step towards building an independent state
with Jerusalem as its capital, and a strong civil society based on the rule of law, effective
legislative authority, and equality and justice. This indicated the MP’s awareness that the
feminist agenda cannot be dissociated from the political context of Palestine.
One of the activities of the MP was a national campaign to collect signatures for a
petition based on collective demands identified during meetings held throughout the West
Bank and Gaza Strip. For this purpose, individual committees were formed in all regions,
representing governmental and non-governmental organizations as well as the Palestinian
syndicates and representatives of the political parties. The demands in the petition were
prepared according to international conventions, human rights and women's rights. The
petition called for confrontation and not evasion of the issue of women's rights. By the end
of April 1998, over 15,000 people had signed the document to express their support for the
campaign. The petition was submitted to the Palestinian Legislative Council.
The activities of the Model Parliament were publicized through a wide media cam-
paign. The media component constituted the main feature of the project, with media com-
mittees being established and a media strategy being developed. A series of messages and
slogans for the media campaign were identified. The brief of the media committee also in-
cluded informing the public of the MP’s activities. A bi-monthly report was sent to the Al-
Ayyam newspaper (the second-most-widely-read Palestinian newspaper) for publication as
a supplement. The official TV station and other local TV stations, Palestinian Radio, and
local newspapers regularly covered the activities of the project. Billboards and giant post-
ers about women's rights and equal participation in the building of society were placed in
different parts of the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
A comprehensive evaluation was conducted at the conclusion of the project’s ac-
tivities. One of the main achievements of the project was its success in reaching thousands
of women and men in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Other achievements included raising
the awareness of political parties, especially the leftists, about issues specific to women,
and lobbying with them for better laws for a Palestinian society based on justice and
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equality. In an interview with a Palestinian journalist, three members of the MP later also
listed the following achievements: The MP initiative sparked a debate that had been miss-
ing from Palestinian society for a long time; the MP members were able to communicate
their objectives to the people despite the counter-campaign; the MP campaign succeeded in
ensuring the right of women to discuss their situation and the discrimination against them
in the current laws; the MP members crossed the limits and taboos set by some Islamists
that forbid the people from discussing the Sharia; and, in implementing the slogan that “the
national and social struggle have to be carried out side by side”, the MP filled the vacuum
left by the democratic movement (Othman, 1998).
3.5 The Family Law in Palestine
The ‘Personal Status Law’ (also referred to as the Family Law) in Palestine origi-
nates from Jordanian and Egyptian laws, which in turn are of Ottoman origin and rely on
the Islamic Sharia.28 The Jordanian law is implemented in the West Bank, while the Egyp-
tian one is implemented in the Gaza Strip.29 In modern-day Palestine, these laws have not
been changed or amended due to the Israeli occupation. Palestinian women activists and
lawyers have written several revisions and critiques of the Personal Status Law, discussing
the discriminatory articles in it.30 The focus of the MP was to deal with matters of mar-
riage, divorce and child custody as well as the rights and obligations within and outside the
family unit – for example, for a wife to have the right to work outside the
                                                
28 There is no clear idea about what constitutes the ‘Sharia’. It has never been defined or collected in a sys-
tematic manner or in a single written body of work. The Sharia is best understood as shared ideas of Islamic
society, based on a literature that is broad but not necessarily consistent or approved by any single authority.
As Vikor (1998) observes, this situation contrasts with the legal systems in the contemporary world, where
the law is defined as a systematic set of sections written into a code and authorized by a specific elected
body. However, the Sharia does not have such a specific form; therefore it is known as an uncodified set of
laws. Strictly speaking, the Sharia is not a set of ‘religious’ laws, in that it covers both the religious sphere (a
person’s relation to God) and the non-religious sphere (interpersonal relations). In this second sphere, the
Sharia can be changed in accordance with historical and social circumstances. Religious courts in practical
terms are concerned with the second sphere.
29 For the West Bank, the Jordanian Law of Personal Status, gazetted in 1976. For the Gaza Strip, the Gaza
Law of Family Rights, issued by the Egyptian governor-general in 1954.
30 For example, Khadr (1998), which was deliberately and misleadingly portrayed by some Islamist leaders
as being representative of the MP project.
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family home or to ‘visit’ her parents’ house without needing her husband’s permission.
It is important to note that contracts, criminal proceedings, civil disputes and com-
mercial endeavours are governed by secular law. The Family Law is the last and only law
derived from the Islamic Sharia. The Sharia system is based upon the fiqh (Islamic juris-
prudence), which is considered the ‘scientific’ reflection of the Quran and its interpreta-
tion. The Sharia is applied by the Sharia (religious) courts, which have jurisdiction in mat-
ters of personal status and familial relations. This law is primarily based on the Hanafi
doctrine, one of the four major Sunni schools of law. It also incorporates rules from other
Sunni schools.
Under the Family Law, women have no right to make marriage decisions. All deci-
sions about marriage are made by a ‘marriage guardian’ or matrimonial tutor.31 The law
makes it difficult for a woman to obtain a divorce because she has to prove that she has
been damaged physically, psychologically and emotionally in the marriage. The grounds
on which the wife can apply for divorce include non-payment of maintenance, desertion,
certain diseases of the mind/body, etc., while the husband is allowed to break the marital
bond at will.32 The law also confirms the right of men to four wives (polygyny).33 It con-
firms inequalities in matters of inheritance; a daughter receiving half the amount a son
would in a similar situation. Under many circumstances, on matters of inheritance the
family law favours distant male relatives on the man’s side of the family over the wife or
female descendants. By favouring males and kin on the male side, the Family Law solidi-
fies ties within the extended patrilineal kin group. In this way, it defines the kin group
                                                
31 Chapter 2, Article 11 of the Gaza Law of Family Rights and Chapter 2, Article 9 of the Jordanian Personal
Status Law No. 61. There is some dispute over whether in fact a woman needs a guardian’s permission to
marry under the law. For more information on Islamic family law and its practice in Palestine, see Welchman
(1999).
32 Chapter 10, Articles 85, 86, of the Jordanian Personal Status Law gives the husband the right to divorce
his wife by saying ‘talaq’ (divorce) on three separate occasions; even if he says it only on one occasion, his
wife is still divorced if he does not revoke it during the ‘Idda’ period. This is a period of three months and ten
days after the divorce during which the woman is not allowed to marry anyone else in order to be sure that
she is not already pregnant. Husbands who are unable to speak are allowed to divorce their wives by making
specific motions of the head.
33 Chapter 2, Article 14 of the Gaza Law of Family Rights asserts that a man has the right to marry only four
women. Chapter 5, Article 28 of the Jordanian Personal Status Law allows a man to marry a fifth time pro-
vided he divorces one of his four wives. The term ‘polygyny’ denotes the marriage of a man with two or
more women. However, some writers prefer to use the term polygamy, which means the concurrent marriage
of a member of one sex with two or more members of the opposite sex (Marshall, 1998).
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rather than the nuclear family unit as the significant locus of solidarity. It facilitates the
maintenance of tribal communities. The Family Law thus has implications for the broadest
social structures at the same time as it subordinates women.
The Family Law also denies women the right of guardianship and child custody
after divorce. In these matters, in Gaza, mothers are granted the right to serve as ‘nurses
and maids’ till their sons are nine years old and their daughters around 11 years, the age of
puberty (or marriage), after which fathers reclaim their ‘property’.34 In the West Bank, the
mother “who imprisons herself to look after her children” (Article 162) is allowed to have
custody over both sons and daughters till they reach the age of puberty. In addition, the
Family Law makes women’s mobility as well as their access to employment conditional on
their husband’s or father’s permission.
3.5.1 Debate within the MP about Family Law reform
Some MP members argued that legal reform in general, and that of the Family Law
in particular, promised much but might eventually deliver little. They believed that it is not
enough to change the legal framework under which women are subordinated; what is
needed is a radical change in the power relations of society, which should cover every as-
pect of life. A change in the codes does not overturn the existing power relation, cultural
practices and deeply ingrained prejudices.
Legal reform is a complex process. In the Palestinian context of a Muslim society,
agitation for reform could be read as an attack on original ‘traditions’, a sensitive subject
that many MP members tried to avoid. In analyzing the situation, the MP members found
that among religious groups, reform might be endorsed as the realization of the principles
of Islamic modernism by “some Mullahs at least” and criticized as a distortion of Islamic
norms and customs by others.
To sum up, the essential focus of the MP debate over the Family Law revolved
around critical questions such as: Who draws the lines of what is Sharia and what is not? Is
it the Ulama (religious officials or scholars)? Is it the PA? Is it the diverse Islamists? And
most importantly, what about the women’s movement and the role of women? What about
                                                
34 Section 3, Chapter 2, Article 118 of the Gaza Law of Family Rights, and Chapter 16, Article 162 of the
Jordanian Personal Status Law.
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their diverse opinions concerning the source of legislation? It was obvious that these ques-
tions could not be answered according to logical or legislative patterns. They are matters of
power. Who controls the symbols? Who defines the limits? Who defines what is Islamic
and what is not? What are our sources of legislation? These issues are both a result of and
an element in the distribution of power in society.
Moreover, how can we think about legal reform from a historical perspective, spe-
cifically in relation to the traditions of legal, political and social discourse held by those
who possess power? In other words, how do we perceive the power relation between the
women’s movement on one hand and all patriarchal institutions on the other? Do reforms
of the Family Law work in some way to modify or alter existing gender relations? Should
Family Law reform be considered an important step towards gender-equality, or at least a
kind of ‘curb’ on the patriarchal system? How do we understand the apparent lack of inter-
est on the part of some organizations within the women’s movement?
Some members raised the dilemma of the women’s movement in dealing with such
a complex issue as the Family Law. The law is complex because, as noted earlier, there is
no simple set of rules that constitute the Sharia. The PA states in the draft Basic Law that
Islamic Sharia is the main source of legislation, along with human rights conventions (Pal-
estinian National Authority, 1996). This poses a dilemma for legislators: which source
should be used as a basis for legislation relating to women’s rights, in view of the fact that
some parts of the Sharia discriminate against women? Generally the MP tried to avoid a
confrontation with the PA and the Islamists, for it was clear that the PA was more con-
cerned with accommodating the Islamists than supporting women’s rights. For instance,
when the Women’s Charter was presented to President Arafat in 1995, his response was:
“[I] would accept the principles of the Women’s Charter if they did not conflict with
Sharia law” (Gluck, cited in West, 1997:120).35 (Italics added.) The main outcome of the
MP was a list of demands aimed at correcting gender-based discrimination in the Family
Law.
                                                
35 The Women’s Charter draws upon the Palestinian Charter of Independence, the UN Charter, and interna-
tional human rights charters. It includes, among other demands, the abolition of all forms of discrimination
against women, the building of a democratic society guaranteeing women equal opportunities, and the im-
plementation of the principles of gender stipulated in the Palestinian Charter (Abdu, 1999; Jad, 1995).
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3.5.2 Main demands of the MP
The MP’s demands with regard to the Family Law reflected a compromise on the
part of the members who wanted to reform the law strictly in line with human rights con-
ventions. They had to accept the viewpoint of the other members that the soil was not yet
fertile enough for the seeds of full equal rights before the law. The main demands agreed
by the MP were:
• The minimum age of marriage should be 18 years for both partners.
• Mature partners should not have to have a marriage guardian’s permission for
the marriage contract.
• Women and men should have equal citizenship rights, including the rights to
work outside the family home, continue education, and participate in politics.
Currently, husbands are allowed by the Family Law to deny their wives partici-
pation in such activities.
• Assets that are earned after marriage should be regarded as joint property and a
court should decide their division.
• Alimony should be paid from the date on which the couple separated, and not
the date on which the alimony application was made to the court. The State
should have a fund from which support can be provided to the applicant until
the court has ruled on the application, after which the payments can be recov-
ered from the other partner.
• Rules and regulations should be formulated and enforced to protect women and
guarantee their right to receive their family inheritance.
• Polygyny should be regulated so that a man is only allowed to marry more than
one woman for serious reasons such as health problems, and not simply for his
pleasure. The husband should not be allowed to take a second wife without in-
forming the first one, who should then have the right to ask a court for divorce
on that ground.
• Divorce by either partner should only be possible through the decision of a
court.
• Because of the possibility of intimidation, a mother’s renunciation of her cus-
tody rights should not be accepted. Custody decisions should apply to children
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up to the age of 18. If the divorced mother remarries, a court should decide
which parent can have custody on the basis of the best interests of the children
(MP, 1998).
These demands, as well as the debate in the MP, sparked an extensive counter-
campaign by the Islamists. There were several reasons for their panic. The wide publicity
received by the MP project was one obvious element that they found disturbing. The most
significant element of the MP’s activities that incensed them was the fact that ‘inferior’,
‘emotional’ and ‘irrational’ women were daring to discuss the Sharia and to challenge the
interpretation of the Ulama. This threatened the hegemony painstakingly built up by the
Islamists since the days of the Intifada. It also evoked memories of how their success in
forcing women to wear the veil during the Intifada had been undermined after the return of
Palestinians to the occupied territories as a result of the Oslo agreement. Many of the
women who returned had a different dress code and, because of the widespread presence of
Palestinian police, the Islamists were unable to intimidate them. Thus, their control over
women in Gaza as a whole was also weakened. The Islamists were also infuriated by the
fact that the MP trainers and activists, who were mostly women, were for the most part
secular, educated and affiliated to the leftist parties. As Moghadam (1993:250) observes,
Islamists always attack “women with education … women who refuse and question the
traditional patriarchal relation … for they constitute and symbolize a social change”. The
Islamist counter-campaign will be discussed in the next chapter.
4 THE DISCOURSE(S) OF THE ISLAMISTS AND THE PA
4.1 Introduction
This chapter begins by analyzing the Islamist counter-campaign, which basically
relied on painting the MP members as contributing to the ‘Western conspiracy against Is-
lam’. The Islamists used printed materials as well as speeches in mosques and elsewhere to
denounce ‘evil women’s organizations’ with ‘devilish’ ideas. The chapter also investigates
how both the Islamists and the PA use identity to marginalize the women’s discourse. The
popularity of Islamic ideology is demonstrated by the results of a poll. The PA’s position
on improving Palestinian women’s lives is gauged by examining its practice on various
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levels. In addition, the chapter compares the discourses of the PA and the Islamists, to un-
cover their similarities. Finally, it places the PA within a framework of its relations with
the other actors defined by the concepts used in this study.
4.2 The arena of conflict
The elections to the Palestinian Council in January 1996 were the greatest opportu-
nity in many years for the traditional leadership, kinship identities and affiliations, and pa-
tronage system to be arraigned in a political contest. These conservative elements have the
full support of the PA because they can be used, along with the security forces and police,
as means to exercise power. The proliferation of Palestinian security forces and police can
be viewed as the “most advanced and functional aspect of the neo-patriarchal state”
(Sharabi, 1988:7).36
It is in this environment that the nationalists and Islamists are competing over is-
sues concerning every aspect of life. Questions like the following have become a powerful
element of the politics of Palestine since the Oslo agreement: What kind of state should we
build? Who defines our objectives and aspirations as Palestinian men and women? How do
we define citizenship? What kind of political system do we adopt? What kind of institu-
tions and practices do we have to encourage or discourage? And what kind of relations
should there be between the various social powers and their political representatives?
These issues have become chips in bargaining between the political powers in Pal-
estine, and especially between the Islamists and the nationalists. In this process, the less-
powerful groups such as women are assumed to belong to one or the other side and are
likely to experience pressures from both sides as the elements of power identified by Fou-
cault (1980) come into play: multiple and immanent force relations, ceaseless struggle and
confrontation, the two sides’ support to/ rejection of each other and the strategies in which
force relations take effect
                                                
36 Sharabi believes that Middle Eastern political regimes, whether they are monarchies or republics, radical
or conservative, socialist or populist, all share the essential features of neo-patriarchy. He applies the concept
even more to describe discourses, relations and institutions in the Arab world. Neo-patriarchy refers equally
to macrostructures (society, state, economy) and microstructures (the family or the individual). Sharabi be-
lieves that neo-patriarchy is the product of the encounter between modernity and tradition in the context of
dependent capitalism: it is modernized patriarchy. In the context of this study, such a distinction between
patriarchy and neo-patriarchy is considered unnecessary.
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Women, family, women’s rights, gender roles and identities are at the core of the
process of state building. Issues concerning gender relations, religion and traditions have
their interrelationships, and they have been the subject of debate because of the changes
that have occurred in Palestinian society since the Oslo 1993 agreement as well as politico-
economic changes in general. The 1996 elections provided Palestinians with a chance to
debate the laws and policies that would direct their social affairs. The elections came three
years after WCLAC and other women’s organizations began to raise the consciousness of
women about their legal rights and to conduct research into Palestinian laws that discrimi-
nate against women. These activities led in 1997 to the Model Parliament project, which
highlighted the gender-based discriminatory nature of the inherited legislation in general
and the Family Law in particular.
The articulation of the MP’s campaign for “amendment of the current discrimina-
tory laws”, “democratic laws for a democratic state”, “equal rights for equal citizens”, and
the MP’s demands for equal importance to be given to the social and political agendas met
with much counter-resistance arising from the particular circumstances in Palestine in
1997-98. Those circumstances have given rise to, and shaped the debate around women’s
rights, particularly those rights that are abused by the Family Law. Those circumstances
also explain the current dilemmas facing not only the MP project, but also the whole
women’s movement in its struggle for social justice and gender equity.37 One of these di-
lemmas was the eternal question raised by various political and social groups: Does the
Palestinian women’s movement have a genuine loyalty to Palestinian culture and tradi-
tions? The question is often structured in general terms without reference to a specific tra-
dition or a distinctive loyalty.
The limited resources of the MP, which restricted the project’s reach, and the lack
of co-ordination between women’s organizations,38 leftist parties and NGOs in general
                                                
37 The Palestinian women’s movement covers diverse political positions; sometimes it is a contradictory
amalgam of positions ranging from those of the extreme Left to those of the Islamist women’s organizations.
The membership of the movement is equally diverse, embracing upper- and middle-class leaders, and activ-
ists from the ranks of refugee inhabitants. In this regard, Mayer (1997) observes that the Islamist women’s
organizations have considerable influence at the grass-roots providing services needed by the population.
38 In an interview for this thesis (in August 1999, in The Hague) the Director of the MP project, Hanan Rab-
bani, listed three reasons for this lack of coordination: competition over grants from donor agencies, personal
competition over leadership of the women’s organizations, and political competition related to the political
vision and objectives of the women’s organizations backed by political parties.
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weakened the effect of the MP’s message. On the other hand, the Islamists were able to
launch an extensive counter-campaign, which accused the MP of working against Pales-
tine, Palestinian society, Islamic norms and Islam as a whole. The Islamists not only at-
tacked MP members for their positions on women’s rights, they also criticized their
‘moral’ and ‘personal’ conduct, describing them as prostitutes (Wurmser and Carmon,
1998). They described the MP as the most serious danger to Palestine, one contributing to
the ‘Western conspiracy against Islam’.39 Helie-Lucas (1993) shows that the Islamist dis-
course offers a consensus on two points: the quest for identity and the women’s question.
For the Islamists the worst enemy will always be the alienated national élites who have lost
‘their identity’ and are perceived to be trying to undermine group identity. By linking the
women’s movement with a Western conspiracy against Islam in general and Palestinians in
particular, the Islamists try to turn the distrust of the West bred by historical experience to
their own purposes. From Bertsch’s perspective, the hegemonic power of Islam is mar-
shalled to create the illusion of unity, ignoring the denial of full rights to Palestinian
women, which carries the seeds of disunity. This unity is called up for defence against the
“other” in the form of the West.40 (This point is elaborated further in section 4.4.) Anyone
who tries to shatter the illusion of collective identity is, therefore, an accomplice or agent
of the West. On this point, Kandiyoti (1997) notes that the  Islamists’ interpretation of
cultural integrity is facilitated by the equation between changes in gender relations and ca-
pitulation to Western cultural imperialism.
4.3 The shape of the counter-campaign
Monitoring the printed media over 1997-98 provides substantial indications of the
development of the anti-MP project on the one hand, and the proliferation of the Islamist
discourse on the other. The Islamists used printed materials as well as speeches in mosques
                                                
39 Under the provocative heading, ‘Severe Upsets Among the Ulama and Muslims in the West Bank and
Gaza; Due to MP Draft of Family Law’, the Al-Risala (1998) (Mission) newspaper published an interview
with Sheik Hamid Al- Bitawi, president judge of the Court of Appeal. In this interview, Sheik Hamid said:
“There is a conspiracy against Islam and Muslims, and against the current Family Law. The proposed  law by
the MP claims that there is no need for a bailee [marriage guardian]. This claim is un-Islamic, it is against the
Hadith. The Prophet said, ‘No marriage, unless with bailee’.” (Sabri, 1998: 5)
40 Najmabadi (1993:511) finds the same logic within the Islamist’s discourse in Iran. Women are embodied
in double ‘Other’: “the enemy within, Fitna [moral disorder], and the enemy without, the West” (Italics
original.)
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to develop and articulate their ideas about women’s rights, the role of ‘evil women’s or-
ganizations’ in demolishing ‘Islamic society’ and breaking down Islamic norms and cus-
toms, etc. Sheikh Hayan Al-Idrisi, in an interview with Palestinian Radio, denounced radi-
cal members of women’s organizations as Western-paid enemies of Islam, apostates who –
like the writer Salman Rushdie – deserve death (cited in Wurmser and Carmon, 1998).
Sheikh Bassam Jarrar, a Palestinian Islamist ideologue and one of the leaders of Hamas,
told a foreign female journalist: “Women in itself [sic] are not the devil, but the ideas they
are spreading are devilish because they do not respect the Islamic rules. Those women [MP
members], which are a minority, believe that every revolutionary idea is positive; they did
not realize that they are driven by associations completely extraneous to our society and
beliefs” (Antonelli, 1998).
The Islamists want to see the Sharia codified as a set of State-enforced laws in the
Western sense. In another interview six months after the signing of the Oslo agreement and
a month before PA president Yasser Arafat’s arrival to the occupied territories, Sheikh Jar-
rar declared that the real agenda of Hamas is to ensure that all education curricula are
grounded in ‘Islamic civilization’, not one adulterated by ‘foreign influences’ (Usher,
1994). Thus, Islamist hegemony would contest the PA in a classic illustration of Gramsci’s
conception of cultural hegemony, manufacturing consent through control of institutions
that underpin the political structure in civil society (Marshall, 1998; Cox, 1993).
Asked about the Islamists’ attitude towards the new Palestinian Authority, his reply
was highly significant: “Although the Islamic movement rejects the declaration of princi-
ples [Oslo agreement] … it has no interest in defeating it by force” (Usher, 1994: 28).41 He
clearly envisioned the possibility of co-operation with the PA on the basis of the Islamists
being allowed to control social aspects of Palestinians’ lives.
On the Family Law, Sheikh Jarrar said the preservation and consolidation of Sharia
law relating to the family; the social reproduction of the patriarchal Palestinian family, rep-
resents the greatest potential prize to Hamas. He said it guarantees Palestinian “human
rights as Muslims” (Usher. 1994: 48).
                                                
41 This attitude was repeated in an article written by Sheikh Jarrar himself in 1994, in which he declared that
the areas of confrontation, and thus communication with the PA, are the school curricula and the Family Law
(Jarrar, 1994).
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This is particularly important for Islamists because in most Arab countries this is
explicitly based on Sharia law. It is not necessary for me to say what I think the
Personal Status Law should be. This is a matter of Ulama. But if the authorities
deal with the law in a subjective way, this could lead to violations of the Sharia
and so infringements of our human rights as Muslims. We are not against innova-
tion in law, but we cannot compromise on rights that are guaranteed by the Sharia
(Usher, 1994:48). (Italics original.)
The targets of the counter-campaign are the masses, young and old, women and
men, especially in the poor regions, for they constitute the Islamists’ main supporters.42
Islamist leaders of various parties have given public speeches and issued printed materials
expressing suspicion about the MP’s objectives They have warned about the ‘dangerous
war’ initiated by women’s organizations in general, and the MP in particular, against Islam
and Islamic values.43 Various arguments are presented to convince their audiences that
women are not eligible to discuss the Family Law. Sometimes they mention the Prophet’s
Hadith that “woman lacks reason and religion”; or they raise the cultural perception of
women as persons who lack the capacity for the unemotional judgement that is required for
discussing serious political, religious and societal issues.
Interestingly, the Islamist discourse is not monolithic. Sheikh Jamal Salim, a lec-
turer on Sharia in Nablus (West Bank) and a staunch defender of religious courts, dis-
misses suggestions that it is Islamic to deny women their rights. He told the Hukook Al-
Nas newspaper that: women’s oppression has nothing to do with Islam. Sheikh Salim con-
tended that Islam has given women all rights and that it is the wrong traditions and cus-
toms that are responsible for women’s oppression. However, he denounced the amend-
ments proposed by the MP as a manifestation of rebellion against the Quran and Islam be-
                                                
42 In the Middle East, North Africa, as well as South Asia, the main supporters for Islamists are from middle
and lower middle classes (Afary, 1997).
43 In an interview with the Al-Hayat Al Jadeeda (new life) newspaper, March 1998, Sheik Jarrar said: “The
MP wants to humiliate men; the problem is not political, but religious. We [the Ulama] have no political ob-
jectives. The MP proposals pertain to our lives and families … The MP proposals start from ‘equality’, a
notion of Western origin. We accept the ‘equality’ notion, but it should be clear that the definition and con-
ceptualization has to be in the framework of Islam, which gives women better rights than the West. What the
MP presents is against the Sharia and Quran and the consent of Ulama.” Sheik Jarrar then used the Islamists’
favourite tactic against the MP, linking it with Western enemies of Islam: “They are supported by Western
funds; they want to enforce the Western concepts and Western lifestyle over our lives and civilization ….
they call for legitimizing adultery by their proposed condition that such adultery should be proved by official
complaint. Commenting on the women’s struggle against the Israeli occupation, he said “all the Palestinian
people participated in the struggle against Israel; it is not only women’s groups … their participation does not
give them the right to rebel against Sharia.” (Hamdan 1998: 4)
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cause he believed the MP’s aim to be elimination of the Family Law and the religious
courts.44
Sheikh Atta-Alla Abu-Sibbah, a professor of Sharia at the Islamic University in
Gaza, says that Islam allows women to work outside their homes, but in specific profes-
sions. Examples of these professions are nursing, teaching (especially of children), and
medicine. Moreover, there is no restriction on benefiting from women’s exceptional talents
in any field (Abu-Sibbah, 1998).
In an illustration of how hegemony is linked to discursive power, anonymous leaf-
lets and handbills were also used to attack the MP’s activities as a threat to Palestinian
unity against Israel;45 and at the same time, the Islamist newspapers offered their readers
several weekly columns to discuss the danger to the Palestinian cause and Islamic values
posed by the MP. The columns were positioned next to a platform for the discussion of Is-
lam and a range of issues relating to family, marriage, sexuality, gender relations, female
identity and behaviour.
The Islamists fired their final shots in July 1998 during a big conference in Gaza
organized by the Islamic Salvation Party (which is considered to be the ‘civil’ wing of
Hamas). The conference was held only three months after the MP’s central session.
Speaker after speaker repeated the same statements about women and Islam that had been
part of the counter-campaign.
Sheikh Ahmad Yasin, leader of Hamas, asserts that Islam regards the woman’s role
as mother and wife as the most sacred and essential one in society (Yasin, 1998). He says
neither maids nor baby-sitters can possibly take the mother’s place as the educator of up-
right, complex-free, and carefully reared children. Such a noble and vital role, which
largely shapes the future of nations, cannot be regarded as ‘idleness’. Women should meet
the obligations of Islam and should prepare themselves to educate future generations as
fighters against the enemy.
This echoes Article Eighteen of the Hamas charter, which states:
The women in the house and the family of Jihad fighters, whether they are moth-
ers or sisters, carry out the most important duty of caring for the home and raising
                                                
44 The interview was done in summer 1998 during the MP campaign, the newspaper faxed to the Hague but
unfortunately without the exact date.
45 One of the leaflets was headed, ‘The disaster of religion and honour after the disaster of land’.
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the children upon the moral concepts and values which derive from Islam; and of
educating their sons to observe the religious injunctions in preparation for the duty
of Jihad awaiting them. Therefore, we must pay attention to the schools and cur-
ricula upon which Muslim girls are educated, so as to make them righteous moth-
ers, who are conscious of their duties in the war of liberation. They must be fully
capable of being aware and of grasping the ways to manage their households.
Economy and avoiding waste in household expenditures are prerequisites to our
ability to pursue our cause in the difficult circumstances surrounding us. Therefore
let them remember at all times that money saved is equivalent to blood, which
must be made to run in the veins in order to ensure the continuity of life of our
young and old (Yisraeli, 1989:11).
The biological role of women is the basic tool through which their identity is
shaped and maintained, and it is only recognized in relation to men. A Palestinian
woman’s identity is derived from her role as a ‘carrier’ but not owner of her body, which
has a valuable quality: her reproductive capability. Hamas portrays women’s domesticity
as God-decreed; therefore any attempt to change the woman’s role is sinful and will cor-
rupt society. In addition, women are referred to as social agents and educators; therefore
they have to be educated not for their own sake as citizens or human beings, but as a means
of restoring the glorious past of Islam.46
According to Dr. Ahmad Abu Halabiyya, dean of religious studies at the Islamic
University, Islam gives women only half the inheritance rights of men “because man’s
duty is much greater than that of the woman”. Furthermore,
Concerning women’s role in the public sphere; for the position of a judge, for in-
stance, there is a tendency to doubt the woman’s fitness for the post due to her
more ‘emotional nature.’ The Prophet’s Hadith [says], “A people will not prosper
if they let a woman be their leader” … According to Islam, the head of state is no
mere figurehead. He leads people in the prayers, especially on Fridays and festi-
vals; he is continuously engaged in the process of decision-making pertaining to
the security and well-being of his people …. It is a ‘medical fact’ that during their
monthly periods and during their pregnancies, women undergo various psycho-
logical and physiological changes. Such changes may occur during an emergency,
thus affecting her decision, without considering the excessive strain which is pro-
duced. Moreover, some decisions require a maximum of rationality and a mini-
mum of ‘emotionality’ – a requirement which does not coincide with the ‘instinc-
tive nature’ of women” (Abu Halabiyya, 1998:6-7). (Italics added.)
                                                
46 Taraki (1996) finds the same features within the Islamist’s discourse in Jordan. In her study, she finds that
the Islamists encourage women’s education on the ground that educated women make better mothers and that
it is better for women to provide services to other women.
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It is clear that Islamists try to control women by endowing them with an identity
that limits the options open to them to use their talents outside the home.47 We shall now
look further into the nature and basis of Palestinian identity and how identity definition is
used as one of the strategies of hegemony.
4.4 The issue of identity
In the Palestinian context, the issue of cultural identity is complex and should be
understood in a historical framework. Palestinian society has suffered from many types of
oppression and discrimination since 1948.48 The Israeli policy in the occupied territories is
one of consciously inhibiting any expression of Palestinian national identity, beginning
with school curricula and culminating in the prohibition of any form of national symbol-
ism, from the censorship of national poetry to the banning of the Palestinian flag. This has
led Palestinian society to view its past as the true expression of its nationalism, and tradi-
tion as a fundamental component of its identity (Hasan, 1993). Thus, nostalgia has become
a part of the Palestinian national ethos, and any criticism of it is portrayed as a serious in-
jury to the national identity.
4.4.1 The link between hegemony and identity
Bertsch (1995) links hegemony with the construction of identity, and the Palestin-
ian experience bears out the connection. The construction of Palestinian identity is very
                                                
47 This strategy is similar to that of Islamists in other countries. For example, when it became obvious that
Megawati Sukarnoputri, perceived to be the West’s favourite candidate, intended to run for the presidency of
Indonesia in October 1999, the Indonesian Ulama Board tried to sabotage her chances by declaring in May
“that a woman leading the nation would be contrary to scriptural law” (Newsweek, 1 November 1999:46). In
June, a leading Muslim politician falsely denounced her as a Hindu. When this failed to prevent her party
from winning overwhelming support in the parliamentary elections, the Islamists accused her of being “a bad
Muslim”. Finally, they persuaded Abdurrahman Wahid, a highly popular but seriously ill politician, to renege
on his promise to support Megawati and run for the presidency instead (Keith B. Richburg in The Washing-
ton Post, reprinted in Guardian Weekly, 28 October-3 November, 1999:31). Wahid was voted president by
the People’s Consultative Assembly. “For the first time, Islamic parties had played a decisive role in the
choosing of Indonesia’s president” Ron Moreau, in Newsweek, 1 November 1999:45) After widespread riots,
Wahid persuaded Megawati to accept the vice-presidency.
48 “After 1948, every Palestinian disappeared nationally and legally. Some Palestinians reappeared juridi-
cally as ‘non-Jews’ in Israel; those who left became ‘refugees’ and later some of those acquired new Arab,
European, or American identities. No Palestinian, however, lost his ‘old’ Palestinian identity” (Said,
1980:111). (Italics added.)
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much linked with the patriarchal tradition, whether it is carried out by the nationalist
movement or by the Islamists. Both use identity to strengthen their hegemony.
The Islamists do this by creating a sharp division between them (Israel and the
West militarily, politically and culturally; and therefore, by extension, anyone who wants
to reform Palestinian society in a way that would undermine the hegemony of the Is-
lamists) and us (Palestinian Muslims who accept the Islamists’ interpretation of what is
Islamic and what is not).
The Islamists have made powerful claims on the culturally defined identity of
women, their bodies, and their minds. This is one of the essential elements in their vision
of Palestinian society. Authenticity is viewed as being identical with Islam. “The Islamic
awakening means the return to a conscious linkage with Islam. It also means the will to
develop and to achieve using Islam and its value system as a base … we cannot look at the
Islamic movement as only political … it is also ideological and revivalist motivated by a
great past” (Jarrar, 1994:162). Thus, the Islamists have a different image of Islam, not the
one actually practised by the masses, but the Islamists’ image of the so-called ‘true Islam’
of the age of the Prophet.
Helie-Lucas (1993) refers to the similarities between the Islamist discourse across
Muslim countries. She shows that the discourse centres on identity in three ways: identity
by being under threat, identity as a return to a glorified past, and identity as confined to the
private sphere. In this way, the discourse portrays women as the weak point in the defence
system as well as potential allies of the external enemy. Islamists limit their definition of
Muslim identity to the private sphere; the area that is linked with women’s sexuality.
Hasan (1993) makes the interesting observation that outside the feminist movement, the
only movement which daily devotes hours to discussing, debating and formulating policy
on the question of women is the Islamist movement.
The PA’s concept of identity is based on the definition of Palestinian citizenship,
and this definition is heavily biased towards male Palestinians.49 Throughout the years of
the occupation, the Palestinian nationalist discourse in general downplayed the significance
                                                
49 This ties in with the concept presented by Yuval-Davis (1997) of citizenship rights being closely linked to
gender relations.
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of social differences (in terms of class and gender) in the name of national unity.50 The
gendered discourse of the modern Palestinian national movement has reproduced not only
Palestine as a metaphor, but also the national discourse defining it. The conflation of Pal-
estine and the mother is a striking feature of the nationalist discourse. Mass (1995:470-1)
shows that in the Palestinian Charter, “the Zionist conquest of Palestine is presented as a
rape of the land. It views Palestinians as the children of Palestine, portrayed as a mother.
The Zionist enemy is clearly seen as masculine, and the wrong committed by this enemy
against Palestinians is considered metaphorically to be violence of a sexual nature.” (Italics
added.)
Yet, when the Charter defines Palestinian identity, it is portrayed as a trait that is
transmitted from fathers to sons. The interesting finding in Mass’ analysis is the definition
of who are Palestinians. The Charter states: “Palestinians are those Arab citizens who used
to reside in Palestine until 1947 [before the rape] … and everyone born of an Arab Pales-
tinian father after this date.” Mass concludes that “while the land as mother was responsi-
ble for the reproduction of Palestinians until 1947, the rape disqualified her from this role.
It is now fathers who reproduce the nation, Territory was replaced by paternity” (Mass,
1995:472). (Italics added.)
The same feature is found in the draft Palestinian Basic Law, which was placed be-
fore the Legislative Council in 1996:
“The birth of the Palestinian Authority on the soil of the homeland, the land of the
fathers and grandfathers, comes in the sequence of the … struggle of Palestinian
people who have given thousands of martyrs, wounded people, and prisoners from
the best of their sons” (Palestinian National Authority, 1996). (Italics added.)
Defining Palestinian land as inherited property transmitted from fathers and grandfathers,
it metaphorically denies the legitimacy of mothers and grandmothers to claim their nation-
ality. The Palestinian Authority is explicitly portrayed as part of a historical process in
which the only Palestinians who have suffered are the sons of Palestine.
In addition, like the Islamists, the PA tries to restrict women to the home, and thus
their identity revolves around marriage and motherhood, which are glorified as being a vi-
                                                
50 It is worthwhile to mention that there are ideological differences between the PLO factions. While the
PFLP and DFLP adopt a Marxist ideology, Fatah, the largest movement, adopts a non-Marxist ideology.
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tal service to the nation.51 This is a way for the PA to retain the consent of the people (and
thus maintain its hegemony) and provide the Islamists with the space they desire in the
hope that they will then keep out of the political sphere. However, the PA’s vulnerability to
external pressures in international relations tends to complicate this picture at times and the
PA then allows the women’s discourse extra room to operate. The Model Parliament proj-
ect was an example of such a concession. However, as we shall see later, it was a half-
hearted concession, apparently made to please external donors while having the advantage
of focusing the attention of the Islamists on the MP and thus out of the political sphere.
There is another force that has the potential to influence the formulation of Pales-
tinian identity: the Left. Leftists are normally natural allies of women’s movements, even
though they may try to influence them ideologically. However, the Left is not in a
hegemonic position in any sphere of Palestinian life; it relies on alliances and so dreads
confrontations. Thus, when women’s groups organize to eradicate gender discrimination
they receive a cool response from the Left, which raises concerns about ‘washing our dirty
linen in public’ and thus giving the Islamists weapons to use against their Palestinian op-
ponents (Hasan, 1993).52
The focus of the Islamists’ attacks is chosen well. Moghadam (1993:250) observes
that “they attack and direct their backlash at this stratum of women; women with education
and jobs, women who refuse and question the traditional patriarchal relation, women who
rebel against gender discrimination for they constitute and symbolize a social change.” El-
Saadawi (1989) also finds that this mechanism emphasizes creation of an atmosphere in
which the Islamists focus on sex discrimination, sexism, and an emphasis on women as
dangerous objects.
                                                
51 PLO leader Yasser Arafat says, “The wombs of Palestinian women are bombs in the confrontation with
the Israelis” Quoted in (Al-Bizri, 1995:172).
52 Ironically, during the liberation struggle, the majority of Palestinian female prisoners in Israel were from
Left-wing organizations, while the majority of the male prisoners were from Fatah. (Antonious, 1981, cited
in Jad, 1995:247). By 1979, 3000 women had been imprisoned in Israel for political and military activities
(Jad, 1995).
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4.4.2 Popularity of Islamic discourse
In constructing gender, female identity, and gender relations, both the PA and the
Islamists rely mostly on the strong hegemonic power of Islamic ideology. Any question
about the reaction of Palestinians to this tactic was dispelled in March 1999 when the Jeru-
salem Media and Communication Center conducted a poll to determine the attitude of Pal-
estinians towards Sharia law and the various political parties. Respondents were asked: If
the Palestinian Authority implements the Islamic law, how will this affect your position
regarding the authority? Will it increase your support, increase your opposition, or not af-
fect your position at all? The vast majority of respondents (63.9%) said they would support
the PA more if Islamic Sharia law were implemented.53 The full results of the poll are
given in Table 4.1.
The results indicate that, on the level of mass consciousness, most Palestinians
continue to believe in the ideal of religious hegemony over everyday life and politics.
However, this support for the implementation of Islamic Sharia is not indicative of support
for the Islamist parties. When the response is broken down by party support, the poll shows
that Hamas and Jihad (representing the main Islamist parties) together received only 17.3%
of the people’s support, while Fatah (the ruling party) received 37.6%. This could indicate
that the Sharia is popularly perceived as a means of orientation which believers follow out
of their own free will, and which the State should enforce only as a manifestation of cul-
tural identity rather than as real support for political Islam.
   Table 4.1 Change in support for the PA if Sharia law is implemented in Palestine
Response Total West Bank Gaza Strip
Increase my support 63.9 61.1 68.7
Decrease my support 2.4 2.5 2.2
Will not affect 27.0 28.8 24.0
Increase my opposition 1.9 2.6 0.7
Decrease my opposition 2.9 2.5 3.7
No answer 1.9 2.5 0.7
   Source: http://www.jmcc.org/polls/1999/no31.htm
                                                
53 The pollsters interviewed a random sample of 1199 people over the age of 18 in the West Bank and the
Gaza Strip; of these, 49.1% were male and 50.9% were female.
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What the poll shows convincingly is that Islam can be used by the PA to strengthen
its hegemony. Of course, whether or not the PA will do so, and to what extent, is another
question. Before taking too drastic a step, the PA would have to take into account possible
reactions in Israel and the U.S. In terms of Holsti’s conception of power, the PA does not
have the capabilities to influence other countries to support its action due to its relative
powerlessness (Holsti, 1983:164-8). Therefore, the other two elements of power, acts and
responses, are relevant in its case only to some degree. The support for Islamic laws is
also, in part, probably due to the political, social and economic difficulties experienced by
Palestinians. Moghadam (1995:7) writes that “[the] cultural cannot be properly understood
outside of its relation to the political and especially the economic.”
The people are disappointed that the new Authority has brought them neither inde-
pendence nor social justice.54 This plays a great role in strengthening their belief that jus-
tice can be achieved through Islamic laws. Constructing a mythical past about Islamic jus-
tice is one of the mechanisms used by Palestinians to endure current hardships and dream
of a better future.
So far, this chapter has shown how both the PA and the Islamists have used religion
to strengthen their hegemonic power in Palestine. However, in terms of details, it has con-
centrated mostly on the tactics used by Islamists. The next section will examine the PA’s
role in marginalizing the Palestinian women’s discourse and the reasons for it.
4.5 The PA’s role in marginalizing the women’s discourse
The PA faces pressure on the regional level from Israel and on the international
level from the U.S. to meet its obligations under the Oslo agreement as the guardian of Is-
rael’s security. It responds to this pressure by implementing a policy of repression, espe-
cially towards those who have been defined by the Israelis and Americans as terrorists (the
Islamists). On the domestic front, the PA rationalizes its repressive practices towards the
Islamists, NGOs and the Press under the old justification of ‘national unity’, ‘collective
interests’, etc. The worsening social and economic situation also makes the PA nervous
about the slightest threat to its power.
                                                
54 For more details about the dramatic impact of Oslo on the Palestinian economy, see (Roy, 1996; 1998).
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The women’s movement has not been a direct target of PA attacks or repression.
Therefore, an observer might be forgiven for thinking that the PA supports the campaign to
ensure that Palestinian women are no longer deprived of their human rights. Such a con-
clusion would be false. If the PA were truly interested in changing the social status of Pal-
estinian women, it would have produced and disseminated documents on the issue and
used the media to build support for women. However, there are no documents; nor are
there any records of official statements/speeches in favour of the women’s cause. In the
absence of such documents, this study will gauge the PA’s attitude to women’s issues in
Palestine by investigating its actual practice: Is it gender-sensitive? What message does it
convey about women? Does the PA try to help the women’s cause in areas where it would
be relatively easy to do so? The answer to questions like this should produce some idea of
what role, if any, the PA plays in the marginalization of Palestinian women. The questions
will be answered after outlining the PA’s practice with relation to the Model Parliament,
the media, and international donor’s community.
4.5.1 The Model Parliament
As noted earlier, the PA supported the formation and deliberations of the Model
Parliament. Its newspapers and other media reported on the proceedings every day. In ad-
dition, some members of Fatah in the Legislative Council expressed their readiness to sup-
port the proposed amendments to the Family Law.
All this made some women’s organizations optimistic about the PA’s attitude to-
wards women’s issues. They felt that in a Palestine governed by a non-Islamic party, a new
area of mobilization had become accessible, and that this would help women to negotiate
social rights within the emerging State structures. They asserted that the women’s move-
ment had found its voice post-Oslo in trying to affect a wide range of emerging social poli-
cies that would underpin the progress of women (Hammami and Kuttab, 1999). And then
came the intensified attacks and intimidation by the Islamists who were obviously alarmed
over the women’s campaign.
The significant aspect of the attack by the Islamists was the reaction of the PA.
Upon request, the police provided security at the parliament venue (which, after all, was
their duty), but that was all. There was a deafening silence from the PA even as the Is-
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lamists increased the tenor of their attacks, publicly labelling the MP members prostitutes,
spies for Israel and the Western countries in speeches at mosques, universities and public
meetings, as well as through the information media.
The PA’s silence raises doubt about its commitment to women’s rights. It cannot be
explained by inability to act: when the Islamists criticize the peace process or PA practices,
the PA reacts harshly with imprisonment of their activists. Thus, we need to look for an-
other explanation. The key can be found in Foucault’s definition of power as force rela-
tions, the process which, “through ceaseless struggles and confrontations, transforms,
strengthens or reverses [the force relations]; as the support which these force relations find
in one another; … and lastly, as the strategies in which they take effect, whose general de-
sign or institutional crystallization is embodied in the state apparatus, in the formulation of
the law, in the various social hegemonies” (1980:92-3). What benefit could the PA receive
from first supporting the MP and then standing by while it was being attacked? Could the
answer be found in the force relations between it and other actors?
An obvious benefit from support to the MP was the approval of donors. However,
if that had been the main reason for the PA’s support, it would have tried to find some way
to blunt the attacks on the MP instead of letting them become worse. There was another,
not-so-obvious benefit: the distraction of the Islamists from the peace process. It serves the
interests of the PA to have the Islamists kept busy in a confrontation with the women’s
movement because then the PA can proceed with the peace negotiations unhindered. Thus,
the more the Islamists mobilized against the MP, the greater was the benefit to the PA. It
was a perfect example of how the interactions that make up international power politics
can have a negative effect on the human rights of Palestinian women.
4.5.2 The media
The PA’s strategy of using religion to maintain and strengthen its hegemony is re-
flected in its media. The official PA television station broadcasts a significant amount of
discourse on Islam and the assertion that Islam must at all times govern and define the per-
sonal and social life of Palestinians. There is an increasing amount of religious program-
ming. Daily broadcasts begin and end with recitations from the Quran, the call to prayer
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interrupts programming, the Friday mosque prayers are televised; there are even religious
television serials about the early days of Islam.
One programme in particular, broadcast live every Friday noon, is aimed at fami-
lies. Viewers can phone in for information or advice on matters related to Sharia rules,
family life, family law, female dress and behaviour. The special guest each week is an
Ulama from the Ministry of Islamic Affairs or the mullah of a mosque. Again, the content
of the Islamic discourse is the same as elsewhere. Sometimes the questions are such that
the discussions merely emphasize trivialities and raise them to a level of great religious or
legal significance.55
The use of the PA media in this way ties in with the construction of identity by he-
gemonies (Bertsch, 1995; Althusser, 1995). As discussed above, Scott’s (1996) concept of
gender in the context of relationships of power involved four interrelated elements: (i)
culturally available symbols; (ii) normative concepts that set forth interpretations of the
meanings of the symbols, such as religious, educational, legal and political doctrines; (iii)
politics and reference to social institutions and organizations; and (iv) subjective identity,
which theorizes about the reproduction of gender through enculturation of the biological
sexuality of individuals.
The PA, through its TV programmes, creates symbols of ideal womanhood, inter-
prets those symbols, places them in the political and institutional context and ensures con-
tinued control of women’s biological sexuality. “It is a direct disciplining of women’s
bodies for political ends,” as Hammami (1990:25) puts it in another context.
It is an irony of Palestine that a secular State is trying its utmost to prove that it can
be as religious as the Islamists. The reason for this is simple: the PA has no other choice.
Having weakened its legitimacy through corruption (Bishara, 1998; Halevi, 1998; Chom-
sky, 1993) and inability to bring economic benefits to the people (Roy, 1996; 1998),
knowing the popularity of the Islamic discourse (as demonstrated most recently by the poll
summarized in Table 4.1) and unable to present an effective counter-discourse, it is forced
to appropriate the discourse of its rivals. As Moghadam (1995) points out, élites deploy
                                                
55 For example, a question concerning the effect of nail polish on praying practice, or one concerning the use
of a specific shampoo and its effect on praying practice.
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cultural resources and rhetoric to maintain their position and lend it legitimacy, in order to
divert attention from economic failure and social inequalities.
4.5.3 Bias against half the population
As shown in Chapter 2 (section 2.2.6), the Palestinian Authority is an excellent ex-
ample of a patriarchy ruled by the president. With the most crucial reins of power (secu-
rity, police, interior and exterior ministries, leadership of the Executive Authority) in his
hands, he is well situated to ensure that women can obtain civil service jobs on an equal
basis with men. However, in the PA patriarchy, civil service jobs are plums given only to
those who are well connected socially and politically.
Almost every ministry in Palestine has a women’s department supported financially
by the UNDP, which also, together with other international agencies, finances women’s
NGOs providing gender training courses. This might suggest to an observer that the PA
wants to improve the status of women, but that would be an incorrect conclusion. There are
few jobs available to women, and the training and other gender-related activities are useful
for hiding the patriarchal nature of the PA. International institutions normally insist on a
suitable gender ratio in the programmes they fund. So, to determine how much the PA’s
rhetoric about women corresponds with its practice, it is interesting to check to what extent
Palestinian women are benefiting from such programmes.
A 1996 analysis of the World Bank’s programme in the West Bank and Gaza Strip
referred to the fact that Palestinian women experts were not included among the so-called
‘experts’ in the human resources team, in spite of their prominent role in the specific fields
of expertise – health, education and vocational training (Kuttab et al., 1996). The report
also observed that the programme was primarily in the field of construction, which is pre-
sumed to require male labour. Similarly, the housing and commercial sectors, which also
benefit from such aid, are mostly limited to men. The report concluded that:
The invisibility of women in the World Bank’s program … leads us to the obvious
conclusion that the program does not reflect a gender-aware approach that takes
into account women’s economic and social roles and contribution and does not
integrate women into the structure of Palestinian society. The program invests in
half the population … the program is primarily an attempt to “mend” rather than
develop Palestinian society in a more comprehensive context (Kuttab et al.,
1996:36)
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4.5.4 Quranic judgement versus modern legislation?
The examples in the previous sub-sections make it clear that in its actual practice,
the PA has shown that it is not interested in resolving the serious problems facing Pales-
tinian women. Analyzing the crisis in the women’s movement in Palestine in the post-Oslo
period, Hammami and Kuttab (1999) argue that the public portrayal of the women’s
movement as an ally of the PA is misleading. They attribute the PA’s current acceptance of
women’s movement activism as being due to its perception that the women’s movement
does not pose a political threat to it.56 However, that leaves an important question unan-
swered: As the women’s movement develops, a time is bound to come when its success
poses a threat to the patriarchal nature of the PA. What will the PA’s position be then?
The real attitude of the PA is indicated by the Fatah party’s secretary in Gaza, who
said that “in any walk of life where Quranic judgement was available, modern legislation
should not be introduced” (Wurmser and Carmon, 1998:3). Fatah’s weekly newspaper
warned the women’s movement not to “overdo its demands as the society it worked in was
Palestinian and not Swedish, Swiss, or French” (Al-Awda, cited in Wurmser and Carmon,
1998:3). The most explicit attitude was taken by Fatah members of the Legislative Council
during a formal meeting with some members of the MP in Gaza in April 1998. They fo-
cused on the need to respect ‘our religion’ and ‘our culture’. They also said that women’s
issues were not a high priority on the PA’s agenda because the Israeli occupation was the
primary concern.57 Their words were almost the same as those of conservative representa-
tives of the Council at the meeting, who also accused the MP of not observing religious
and cultural traditions and labelled the MP a Western tool because of its funding sources.
Obviously, being able to survive only on Western funds did not make the patriarchal PA a
Western tool, but when women obtained external support for their struggle to win human
rights, they could only be viewed as puppets. This similarity between the PA and the Is-
lamists was not a coincidence, as the next section will show.
                                                
56 The PA regularly tries to put human rights centres on the defensive by questioning them about their fund-
ing sources. When the MP project started creating a widespread impact, resulting in the counter-campaign by
the Islamists, the PA began to use similar tactics against it.
57 This echoes the nationalist slogans during the liberation struggle, “women will be liberated when society
is”.
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4.6 Comparison of PA and Islamist discourses
In the 1970s, the Palestine Liberation Organization wanted to build a ‘secular’ state
that would derive its laws from international conventions and human rights standards. In
the late 1980s, changes in international and regional politics (the fall of the Eastern Bloc,
the second Gulf war and the recognition of the U.S. as the sole superpower) impelled the
PLO to accept the Oslo agreement even though it left many important issues unresolved.
On the other hand, the objective of the Islamists in the 1980s (of Hamas, in par-
ticular), and especially during the Intifada, was to establish an alternative to the PLO proj-
ect politically and socially. Hamas’ political alternative was to build a religious Islamic
state in which the main source of legislation would be the Quran and Sharia.58 However,
today, five years after Oslo, there are some indications that Hamas is changing its priori-
ties. It is now more concerned with a social agenda than a political one. In other words,
Hamas relies on its relative political power to achieve social objectives, and specifically
regulation of family life.
This position was expounded in the quote by Sheikh Jarrar earlier in this chap-
ter.During the Intifada resistance, Hamas’ activities were less a national struggle than a
vicious social offensive against all manifestations of ‘un-Islamic behaviour’, especially in
the Gaza Strip where women were forced to wear the headscarf as a sign of both modesty
and nationalist rectitude. One of the pervasive wall slogans in Gaza at that time was,
“Hamas considers the unveiled to be collaborators with the enemy” (Usher, 1995b:67).
Thus, with a mixture of consent and coercion, Hamas demonstrated its leading-group
power, to use Gramsci’s terminology (Arrighi, 1993).
It was clear that the wearing of the hijab (veil) was not about modesty, respect, or
nationalism, nor was it to protect women “against male sexism” (Moghadam, 1992:428).
There were several objectives here: On the one hand, imposing hijab would serve to negate
female sexuality and redefine gender rules (Moghadam, 1992). On the other hand, it would
serve to establish a new political reality on the ground; to redirect the Intifada from what
was seen as a highly democratic process to a direction that was considered desirable by the
Islamists and Israeli authorities (Hasan, 1993). It was a manifestation of Islamist power to
                                                
58 For more details, see (Yisraeli, 1989); (Taraki, 1989); (Litvak, 1998).
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impose rules by attacking secularist groups and the national movement at their most vul-
nerable points: over issues of women’s liberation (Hammami, 1990). In doing so, the Is-
lamists distorted values, especially those related to women’s liberation within the national
liberation process. In this process, as Hasan (1993) shows, tens of women were murdered
as alleged ‘collaborators’ just because their personal behaviour was not in conformity with
the norms of patriarchal tradition. Thus, the Intifada as a revolutionary action was turned
into a social counter-revolution. In reaction to Hamas attacks, the unified leadership of the
Intifada, which represented a coalition of different national movements, condemned the
attacks and issued a statement that defined attacks on women as a political crime.59 Soon
after, the unified leadership modified its language; called for ‘national unity’ against Israel,
and referred positively to religion in society.
It is not the aim of this thesis to analyze the shortcoming of the progressive and
democratic forces in the Intifada, yet the marginalization of these forces is of major sig-
nificance for the political future of Palestine. Today the only political opposition to the PA
is the Islamists, who continue their influence through “cleverly calibrated tactics of guer-
rilla warfare, political alliances and a pragmatic social agenda.”(Usher, 1995b:69). The Is-
lamists’ ultimate goal, as we noted above, is not to destroy the peace process, nor is it to
radically oppose the PA’s political project. Their aim is to re-assert Islamic culture as the
predominant feature of Palestine. In the end, the price of the ascendance of Islamists will
be paid not only by women, but by all the democratic, secular and leftist forces in Pales-
tine.
Hasan (1993) believes that Islamists have to be analyzed as anti-democratic, anti-
equality and anti-human rights movements. This analysis echoes the argument in Hilal
(1995) about the lack of democracy in the PA (as described in Chapter 1), and Abdu
(1999) who shines the spotlight on the patriarchal and undemocratic nature of the PA (as
outlined in Chapter 2). Experience with the PA has shown that with reference to the
women question, specifically those critical  issues that deal  with women’s  sexuality, there
                                                
59 The basic membership of the Unified Leadership of Intifada consisted of four major ‘secular-nationalist’
organizations within the occupied territories: Fatah; the popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP);
the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP); and the Palestinian Communist Party (PCP)
(Cobban, 1990).
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is no difference between the Islamist and nationalist discourses.
Generally, the Islamic discourse, whether articulated by PA institutions or Is-
lamists, explicates an extremely gender-biased interpretation of Islamic principles and so-
cietal values. Their essentialization is inherent in the willingness to adopt unquestionably
any practice of a so-called ‘real Muslim’, whether these practices are actual or are imag-
ined, specifically those related to women’s sexuality, and then shift these practices to a
sign of national, religious commitment and cultural relevance. As Moghadam argues,
“Sexual politics are at the centre [of their policies] which seek reordering of society and
the construction of a new moral and cultural order based on rigid sex roles and the exalta-
tion of the patriarchal family” (1992:426).
Any analysis of the Islamic discourse produced by the Islamists or PA institutions
shows an extremely similar image of family and gender relations, women, and ‘ideal Mus-
lim female identity’. The discourse asserts the existence of a “transcultural and transhis-
torical Muslim identity and completely negates the diversity of traditions and cultures in
which Islam has been propagated” (Helie-Lucas, 1993:6).
4.6.1 The use of culture
Chapter 2 mentioned Chatterjee’s (1989) observation that nationalist movements in
developing countries divide the domain of culture into two spheres – the material and the
spiritual. This feature is displayed by the nationalist and Islamist cultural discourses in Pal-
estine, both of which try to keep the private, spiritual domain – the domain of culture, es-
pecially family values, where women reside – secure from ‘infection’ by Western values
and practices.
The Islamists have no problems with Western techniques and modes of organiza-
tion being adopted, but there is a problem in adopting non-Islamic ‘values’ (Kramer,
1992), especially those related to women’s liberation. The adoption of a Western lifestyle
by a man is viewed as modernization, but when a woman does not conform to conservative
conventions, she is regarded as being Westernized, which has negative connotations.
The difference between the Islamist and nationalist discourses lies in the way that
each portrays women. The nationalist discourse attempts to protect society through the
protection of women, while the Islamists attempt to protect society from women. They
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view women as innately disgraceful weaklings who can easily be influenced into ‘evil’
ways. Moghadam (1995) shows that the Islamist discourse portrays women as members of
society through whom imperialism can penetrate a culture and wreak havoc on it. The
West deprives women of chastity, modesty and honour through notions of autonomy, sex
appeal, immorality, pornography, and so on. Thus, it can weaken Islamic culture once it is
allowed in.
4.6.2 The influence of class
Another explanation for the similarities in national and Islamist discourses where
conceptions of gender relations are concerned is that the leadership of both movements
comes from the same class background. Sharabi writes that the similarity between the dis-
courses is due to the petty bourgeois origin of the two political movements. The petty
bourgeoisie, as he defines it,
… is in fact a hybrid class linked culturally and socially to its peasant and bour-
geois origin, forming a historical outgrowth of the conditions of external and in-
ternal dependency. Economically, it is a non-productive class, strongly oriented
toward consumer capitalism. Its position in the productive process is peripheral
and parasitical and its values and social relations are traditional, accounting in part
for its ideological ambivalence and unstable social and political orientation. The
neo-patriarchal ethos is nowhere more strongly or clearly expressed than in the
petty bourgeoisie: in it are simultaneously projected and magnified all the contra-
dictions of neo-patriarchy – between tradition and modernity, religion and secu-
larism, capitalism and socialism, production and consumption. None of these
contradictions can find resolution in this culture, which seems endlessly to gener-
ate conditions of conflict and debility, leading it to apparently inevitable collapse
(1988:126).
In the Palestinian context, we witness the phenomenon mentioned by Sharabi. The
patriarchal familialism oppresses women on one hand and retards the development of the
rule of law on the other. This, combined with total economic dependence on Israel, has
helped the petty bourgeoisie to become stronger and flourish. What makes the dependency
relation worse, as Bishara (1998) mentions, is the readiness of the Palestinian political élite
within the PA to forge personal ties with this or that Israeli official, or disputes as to which
group will control this or that local agency representing Israel or foreign companies. Bis-
hara concludes that the obstacles preventing the emergence of a Palestinian political élite
largely free of this type of dependence are the same as those blocking democratic trans-
formation. They are rooted in patriarchy.
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4.7 The PA in a conceptual framework
The PA came into existence because of the Oslo agreement. Therefore, in order to
define the PA conceptually, we have to analyze the relation between Palestine and Israel,
which is one of dominance by Israel. Dominant power implies a “power that can measure
strength against its rivals combined” (Stoll and Ward, 1989:36). Dominance in interna-
tional relations is defined by the “ability of one state to determine the conditions in which
interstate relations are conducted and to determine the outcomes in these relations” (Cox,
1993:264). Israel meets the three elements of power defined by Holsti (1983), as set out in
Chapter 2. It has the capability to influence Palestine, it undertakes many actions for this
purpose, and it obtains the desired results from Palestine. These three elements are basic to
Israel’s power politics.
This study conceptualizes and analyzes the PA in the framework of power and he-
gemony as defined by Foucault and Gramsci. One aspect of Gramsci’s notion of hegemony
involves resistance and negotiations. These can be perceived as discourses because they
include specific kinds of knowledge, institutions and practices. In order to change the
power relation with Israel, the Palestinians use a combination of resistance and negotiation.
The Islamists use the discourse of resistance, while the PA enforces the discourse of nego-
tiation. The PA’s discourse since the Oslo agreement has increasingly focused on negotia-
tion at the expense of resistance, thus, delegitimizing the discourse of the Islamists. The
negotiation discourse changes the perception of Israeli violations of Palestinians’ human
rights and other anti-Palestinian activities into mere violations of the peace process. Thus,
the crucial factor in relations between Palestine and Israel becomes the PA’s compliance
with its role as guardian of Israel’s security, and not a confrontation between the colonizer
and the colonized.
In Chapter 2 we saw that hegemony has three dimensions: intellectual and moral
dimensions, which refer to leadership and consent; and the political dimension, which re-
fers to domination, subjugation, force and coercion (Cuneo, 1999). When “the consensual
aspect of power is in the forefront; hegemony prevails” (Cox, 1993:52). This means that
when a group dominates by force without attaining consent, it is not a hegemonic force.
Gramsci adds that consent and force operate in terms of a dialectical unity: there are times
when force is used, but consent is also necessary in political action. Gramsci also says that
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power is a prerequisite to practising control. Power is a crucial element by which the PA
and the Islamists define and set rules, and measure their ability to restrict or demarcate
each other’s limits. In this sense, in its relation with the Islamists, the PA’s heavy depend-
ence on coercive practices to keep them within their allotted space makes it a dominant
group rather than a hegemonic one. Yet, there are some elements of consent in that rela-
tion.
To obtain that consent, the PA uses the Islamic discourse as well as the liberation
discourse that has been built up over 30 years of occupation. It also uses its control over
the education system and media in general. In addition, the PA has the advantage of being
in office and therefore having the capability to use disciplinary power to build up its he-
gemony. The PA’s power in this respect is derived from its legitimacy, which enables it to
enforce a specific social change or maintain existing social relations, including gender re-
lations, through its ability to pass laws and implement policies. This is a crucial aspect of
the PA’s disciplinary power, providing it with a capacity not only to govern, but also to
guarantee the continuing domination of its discourse. As we have seen, the PA has also
appropriated the discourse of the Islamists and is using it for its own advantage.
In the power relation between the PA and the Islamists, the Islamists are subordi-
nated. The intellectual dominance of the PA does not mean that the Islamists accept the
PA’s dominance. The dialectic of the relation with the Islamists creates daily challenges to
the relatively hegemonic power of the PA as the Islamists try to go beyond the boundaries
allocated to them. Thus, the Islamists, even in their subordinated position, play an active
role and are involved in active confrontation. In a Foucauldian sense, power relations do
not play a repressive role; on the contrary, they are productive wherever they come into
play (Sawicki, 1991). The PA’s repressive practices and unproductive power lead to pro-
ductive resistance from the Islamists. This strengthens the Islamic discourse and women
are the big losers.
On its part, the women’s movement attempts to challenge the discursive power and
hegemony of both the PA and the Islamists because both discourses subordinate women.
Specifically, the women’s movement challenges the Islamic discourse presented by both
the PA and the Islamists. It attempts to counter their hegemonic discourse through the dis-
course of empowerment and human rights.
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The formation and activities of the Model Parliament in Palestine involved three
types of negotiation and resistance: The women’s movement vis-à-vis the Islamists and the
PA; the Islamists vis-à-vis the PA and the women’s movement; and the PA vis-à-vis the
Islamists and the women’s movement.
The power relations between these three parties are not stable because it based on
inequalities and the parties are constantly attempting to change. Therefore, we witness the
Islamists negotiating with the PA on social aspects such as the full Islamization of the
Family Law. The Islamic discourse is, thus, a field of negotiation and resistance between
the PA and the Islamists. On its part, the women’s movement resists and negotiates with
both Islamists and the PA to expand its space and attain more power.
5 CONCLUSIONS
5.1 Importance of the study
The deliberations and activities of the Model Parliament for Women and Legisla-
tion in Palestine in 1997-98 became the focus of an intense campaign by the Islamist par-
ties to ‘protect’ Palestinian women from being ‘infected’ by the virus of ‘foreign ideas’.
The spark that ignited the firestorm of resistance was, on the face of it, a very small one:
the Model Parliament was examining the Family Law with a view to proposing changes
that would remove its gender-based discrimination and bring it into line with international
human rights conventions.
However, the repression of women and their restriction within the domestic sphere
is a central element in the discourse of the Islamists. It is their principal method of control-
ling women’s bodies. Thus, any change in the Family Law is seen as a threat to their he-
gemony. An interesting feature of the resistance by the women and the counter-resistance
by the Islamists was that the Palestinian Authority, which had initially shown signs of sup-
port to the women, retired to the sidelines and said not a word.
The experience confirmed that the Palestinian women’s movement needs to engage
in a “conscious, planned struggle” if it is to succeed in creating a new historical bloc (Gill
and Law, 1993:93). The conscious, planned struggle has to be founded on an understand-
ing of the force relations at work in society. This study is an attempt to analyze those force
relations in the context of the work of the Model Parliament.
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5.2 Conclusions
A comparison of the discourses of the PA and the Islamists shows that there is no
significant difference between them where women’s rights are concerned. The initial ap-
parent variance in their attitude to the role of women and women’s identity has disappeared
in practice, now that the PA has appropriated the Islamic discourse in crucial areas related
to gender relations. For the PA, women are now pawns to be used to sustain and strengthen
its hegemony.
The PA and the Islamist parties co-operate to sacrifice women’s interests because:
their patriarchal nature makes them allies against women; the relative powerlessness of
women makes them easy targets; and the heavy support for the Islamist discourse among
the people gives a political advantage to any party that maintains the gender inequalities in
society. The PA’s marginalization of women is an effect of political pressure from Israel. It
is also a way of countering the Islamists and strengthening its legitimacy. The Islamists
marginalize women as part of their belief system. From their patriarchal viewpoint, they
consider women to be inferior. They also view the women’s movement as easy dupes of an
international anti-Islamic conspiracy. Thus, women’s oppression is not just an effect of the
struggle for power between the PA and the Islamists; it is an integral part of their patriar-
chal discourse. The basis of the co-operation between the PA and the Islamists is accom-
modation of the Islamists by the PA, giving them space to communicate their social
agenda, and acceptance by the Islamists of a limited role at the level of government.
The polarization between the PA and the Islamists occurs in other areas: the rela-
tion with Israel, international relations, and the extent to which the Family Law should be
Islamicized. The reasons for this polarization lie in the constant struggle between them to
strengthen their hegemony and power at each other’s expense, as well as in the historical
experience of the Palestinian people.
It is now possible to come to some conclusions about what needs to be done to in-
vest hegemonic strength in the discourse of the Palestinian women’s movement. In order to
construct a more effective discourse, we have to “disarticulate ‘woman’ from ‘culture,’ de-
construct woman as symbol, reconstruct women as human beings, and problematize
women’s rights as human rights” (Moghadam, 1995:22). One noticeable element in the
counter-campaign of the Islamists was that, despite appearances, they are not a monolithic
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force. Within the main discourse, there are multiple discourses that implicitly, if not
openly, challenge each other to some degree while adhering to the main lines of their
common discourse. A similar situation exists in the PA, where the multiplicity of parties
and their ideologies makes for several (sometimes contradictory) discourses. Such differ-
ences need to be studied and understood for they have potential value for changing power
relations in Palestine. As Foucault points out, “discourse transmits and produces power, it
reinforces it, but also undermines and exposes it, renders it fragile and makes it possible to
thwart it” (1980:100).
Both Islamists and the PA use religion for political purposes. When Islamists raise
the issue of religious doctrine in relation to gender and women’s role in society; they leave
little room for women to negotiate. The discourse of the Islamists as well as the PA seeks
political legitimacy by defending ‘Islamic values’, especially those values that are inter-
preted to deny the legitimacy of women’s rights as human rights. This marginalizes the
discourse of women’s liberation and women’s rights. The women’s movement needs to
keep emphasizing that the interpretation of ‘Islamic values’ by the Islamists and PA is
nothing but a political expedience to maintain power at women’s expense.
5.3 The road ahead
Like other women’s movements, the women’s movement in Palestine needs to base
its strategies on the specific experience and situation of the Palestinian people. Some of the
aspects that need to be kept in mind are outlined below.
The forces which claim to represent the Palestinian nation are extremely diverse in
their ideological origins. The Palestine Liberation Organization is a coalition whose mem-
bers range from Marxists (the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the Democratic
Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and the Communist Party) to the right-wing Fatah
(the leading organization in the PLO, and later the Palestinian Authority). On the other
hand, there is also a strong Islamist movement that claims to represent a major trend in the
Palestinian political arena. This in contrast to some other Muslim countries, where the Is-
lamist discourse has gained prominence because of the failure of the national project. In
Palestine, the Islamists were a strong force even before the state’s existence and they chal-
lenge the PA’s hegemony by relying on substantial popular support. That makes the state-
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building process in Palestine different. As pointed out earlier in this study, this has impli-
cations in terms of force relations.
Palestine is the one of the first national entities to be established after the break-up
of the Soviet Union and the development of a new world order, while in other developing
countries, the state-building process started in a bi-polar world. This means that Palestine
is finding its feet under different international relations, an important consideration since
the international context has an influence on the power balance in Palestine.
In the era of globalization, Palestine is particularly vulnerable to the imposition of
socio-cultural, political and economic ideologies due to its exceptional weakness in the in-
ternational discourse. In addition, the Palestinian case is the only one in which a state is
still in formation. The actual status of Palestine is as a sort of semi-state where the PA has
‘authority’ with a limited mandate and in which Israel continues to have enormous power
over Palestinians. Thus, there will continue to be conflict between the occupying power
and the people living under occupation.
The elements of the women’s agenda have to be clearly formulated. The patriar-
chalism in Palestinian society means that solutions cannot be achieved piecemeal. The
women’s movement has to work on several levels and with different constituencies at the
same time, instead of focusing on a few and ignoring others. It has to find strategies to
work within the all-pervading patriarchalism – which exists even within the democratic
forces, which “were often corrupt, always undemocratic” (Usher, 1995a:46). Women have
to consider themselves as citizens involved in both political and social aspects of national
affairs (Longo, 1999).
As citizens of a geographical entity facing a national threat, women have to con-
tinue participating in the struggle against the occupier, even if they live in a ‘self-
autonomous’ region. On the national level, women should join the democratic forces con-
fronting the PA on questions such as democracy, rule of law, political, cultural and relig-
ious pluralism, equality and social justice, etc. The strong influence of the Islamists and
their total opposition to any change in the position of women makes it necessary for the
women’s movement to challenge their discourse and discredit it.
The dominant ideology in Palestinian society has to be analyzed in order to con-
struct an ideology that is adequate to the women’s political project. That, in turn, will build
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and strengthen the women’s alternative (counter-) hegemony (Bertsch, 1995). This means
that the women’s movement has to rebuild a clear identity of itself as part of the popular
movement confronting the Israeli occupation. It needs to emphasize that national freedom
is not possible while half the population of Palestine is subordinated by the other half. The
women’s movement has to identify itself as part of the democratic movement, which
means participating in the internal political process without ignoring specific gender con-
cerns. This is fully compatible with working on their specific agenda as women and raising
gender issues in all fields.
5.4 Suggestions for further research
This study was hampered by the shortage of documentation on the PA’s position
regarding women’s rights in Palestine. Also, there was no access in The Netherlands to
documents on the campaign by WCLAC and other Palestinian women’s organizations
concerning women’s legal rights. However, in spite of that, it answered the three research
questions posed at the beginning.
In the process of analyzing the main discourses in Palestine, several questions came
to mind regarding the discourses in other countries with a Muslim majority population: Are
the Islamist and nationalist discourses in these countries similar to those in Palestine? Are
the strategies employed in these discourses also similar? If there are differences, do they
hold any significance for the long-term outlook in Palestine? Is the women’s discourse
similar to that in Palestine? If there are differences, what accounts for them? Is there any
similarity in strategies? What are the various trends in the women’s discourses? What fac-
tors inhibit women from learning from each other’s experiences? To what extent are the
lessons of the experience interchangeable? In view of the international co-operation be-
tween Islamists, what women’s networks and other forms of co-operation exist across
countries? How can they be made more effective?
In an age of globalization, international borders are losing significance. The poli-
cies of one country can have serious repercussions on sections of the population in another.
Therefore, co-operation across borders has become an essential form of defence (as well as
offence). Such co-operation also brings rewards in the form of lessons that can be learned
and applied from the experience of others.
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Following up the above questions and the issues related to them would require a
comparative study across several countries as well as a wider literature search than that
conducted for this study. Unfortunately, space and time constraints put such a study be-
yond the scope of this thesis. Therefore, the questions remain to be answered through re-
search over a longer period at some time in the future.
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